巴菲特：商业模式的优善丑（伯克希尔哈撒韦2007年给股东的信）Business - The Great, the Good and the Gruesome

时间：2008年2月29日

来源：Berkshire Hathaway Letters to Shareholders, 2007

原文标题：Business - The Great, the Good and the Gruesome

我在这里和大家谈一谈我们伯克希尔哈撒韦喜欢投资的那些商业模式吧。而且，既然我们已经提到了这个话题，也和大家说说我们尝试不去涉足的商业模式。

Let’s take a look at what kind of businesses turn us on. And while we’re at it, let’s also discuss what we wish to avoid.

查理和我看中公司的以下特点：a） 使用的是我们能读懂的商业模式，b）有利的长期经济前景，c）称职的，可依赖的管理层，d）合理的投资价格。我们倾向于买下整个公司，或者，如果管理层是我们的伙伴的话，买下至少80%的股份。但是，在以控股形式投资优秀公司的方式不可行的情况下，我们也会在股票市场上，买下优秀公司的一小部分股份。和别人共享希望钻石也总归好过拥有一整块人造水晶。（译者注：希望钻石是世界上最著名的钻石之一，其带有诅咒的传说使得参观它的游客络绎不绝）

Charlie and I look for companies that have a) a business we understand; b) favorable long-term economics; c) able and trustworthy management; and d) a sensible price tag. We like to buy the whole business or, if management is our partner, at least 80%. When control-type purchases of quality aren’t available, though, we are also happy to simply buy small portions of great businesses by way of stockmarket purchases. It’s better to have a part interest in the Hope Diamond than to own all of a rhinestone.

一个真正意义上的优秀企业应该有持久的“护城河”以保护其杰出的收益能力。资本主义的动荡本质使得任何能提供高额收益的商业“城堡”会反复地被竞争者们攻击。所以拥有一个强大的壁垒是长期成功的要素，比如该公司能够成为行业中领先的低成本经营者（政府员工保险公司，好市多），或者拥有强大的全球品牌效应（可口可丽，吉列，美国运通）。商业史中充满着“礼花弹烟花”式的公司，其护城河被时间证明是仅仅是幻影，最终被竞争者轻松跨越。

A truly great business must have an enduring “moat” that protects excellent returns on invested capital. The dynamics of capitalism guarantee that competitors will repeatedly assault any business “castle” that is earning high returns. Therefore a formidable barrier such as a company’s being the lowcost producer (GEICO, Costco) or possessing a powerful world-wide brand (Coca-Cola, Gillette, American Express) is essential for sustained success. Business history is filled with “Roman Candles,” companies whose moats proved illusory and were soon crossed.

我们对于“持久”的评判标准使得我们剔除掉了那些更替迅速并持续变化的领域。尽管资本主义的“创造性破坏力”对于整个社会来说是高度有利的，对于投资收益的确定性却是有害的。一个必须持续重建的护城河最终还是会变得不复存在的。

Our criterion of “enduring” causes us to rule out companies in industries prone to rapid and continuous change. Though capitalism’s “creative destruction” is highly beneficial for society, it precludes investment certainty. A moat that must be continuously rebuilt will eventually be no moat at all.

同时，我们的评判标准也剔除了那些需要优秀的管理者才能成功的企业。当然啦，一个优秀的CEO对于任何企业而言都是巨大的财富。伯克希尔有大量这样优秀的管理者。相对于普通CEO，他们能为公司产生数十亿的附加价值。

Additionally, this criterion eliminates the business whose success depends on having a great manager. Of course, a terrific CEO is a huge asset for any enterprise, and at Berkshire we have an abundance of these managers. Their abilities have created billions of dollars of value that would never have materialized if typical CEOs had been running their businesses.

但是如果需要一个明星式的人物才能经营好的公司，其本身很难会被成为优秀。一个由某位当地优秀脑外科课医生牵头合伙经营的医疗站可能能够带来超常的增长型收益，但是这并不代表未来也会这样。如果这位外科医生一但离开，这个医疗站的护城河也不复存在。不过，你可以期望的是，哪怕你叫不出马约诊所的CEO的名字，其机构本身的护城河依然能够持久存在。（译者注：马约诊所是全世界最成功的医疗机构之一）

But if a business requires a superstar to produce great results, the business itself cannot be deemed great. A medical partnership led by your area’s premier brain surgeon may enjoy outsized and growing earnings, but that tells little about its future. The partnership’s moat will go when the surgeon goes. You can count, though, on the moat of the Mayo Clinic to endure, even though you can’t name its CEO.

我们在商业模式中寻找的是能立足于稳定行业的长期的竞争优势。如果能在此之上产生高速有机增长，那就更好了。但是即使没有高速的有机增长，这样的商业模式的回报依然明显。这种情况下我们会将其丰盛的收益用于投资其他相似的企业。并没有人规定你收益只能用于投资原来的公司本身。实际上，这么做常常是错误的根源：真正优秀的公司，在仅利用其自身的有形资产的前提下，难以持久的带来高额收益。

Long-term competitive advantage in a stable industry is what we seek in a business. If that comes with rapid organic growth, great. But even without organic growth, such a business is rewarding. We will simply take the lush earnings of the business and use them to buy similar businesses elsewhere. There’s no rule that you have to invest money where you’ve earned it. Indeed, it’s often a mistake to do so: Truly great businesses, earning huge returns on tangible assets, can’t for any extended period reinvest a large portion of their earnings internally at high rates of return.

优秀的商业模式 THE GREAT

让大家先看看理想型的商业模式的雏形吧，我们的喜诗糖果店。盒装巧克力行业本身并不是令人激动的事物：美国的人均巧克力食用量相当低，而且没有增长。很多红极一时的品牌都消失了，幸存下来的三家公司在过去40年的利润也是杯水车薪。实际上，我相信喜诗糖果，虽然表面上只是在美国几个大州中销售巧克力，实际上赚取的利润快赶上整个行业一半的利润总额了。

Let’s look at the prototype of a dream business, our own See’s Candy. The boxed-chocolates industry in which it operates is unexciting: Per-capita consumption in the U.S. is extremely low and doesn’t grow. Many once-important brands have disappeared, and only three companies have earned more than token profits over the last forty years. Indeed, I believe that See’s, though it obtains the bulk of its revenues from only a few states, accounts for nearly half of the entire industry’s earnings.

1972年，被年蓝筹印花收购的那年，喜诗糖果店的年度销售额为1600万磅糖果（译者注：约为7257.49吨）（那时候查理和我管理着蓝筹印花，随后被伯克希尔收购）。去年喜诗卖出了3100万磅糖果（译者注：约为14061.36吨），增长率只有每年2%。然而，由于经历了喜诗家族50年的经营，还有后来查克·哈金斯以及布拉德·金斯特勒的进一步强化，喜诗糖果的持久的竞争优势为伯克希尔带来了非凡的收益。

At See’s, annual sales were 16 million pounds of candy when Blue Chip Stamps purchased the company in 1972. (Charlie and I controlled Blue Chip at the time and later merged it into Berkshire.) Last year See’s sold 31 million pounds, a growth rate of only 2% annually. Yet its durable competitive advantage, built by the See’s family over a 50-year period, and strengthened subsequently by Chuck Huggins and Brad Kinstler, has produced extraordinary results for Berkshire.

在我们以2500万收购的当时，喜诗糖果有3000万的年销售额和低于500万的税前收益。当时经营需要的资本为800万。（每年有几个月需要一定程度的季节性贷款。）伴随而来的是每年60%的税前投入资本收益。有两个要素降低了喜诗糖果的经营资本需求。第一点是产品都是以现金交易，不存在应收账款。第二点是生产和分销的周期短，最小化了库存。

We bought See’s for $25 million when its sales were $30 million and pre-tax earnings were less than $5 million. The capital then required to conduct the business was $8 million. (Modest seasonal debt was also needed for a few months each year.) Consequently, the company was earning 60% pre-tax on invested capital. Two factors helped to minimize the funds required for operations. First, the product was sold for cash, and that eliminated accounts receivable. Second, the production and distribution cycle was short, which minimized inventories.

去年喜诗的销售额是3.83亿，税前利润是8200万。现在每年需要的经营资本为4000万。这意味着自从1972年起，我们只需要再投资3200万即可保持可观的增长率，以及一定规模的收益增长率。与此同时，税前收益共计达到了135亿。这一切，除了那3200万的投入，都归为伯克希尔所有（或者在早期来说，归为蓝筹印花）。在支付企业所得税以后，我们将这些收益用作收购其他企业的资金。就像亚当和夏娃开创了产生60亿人类的事业一般，喜诗为伯克希尔提供了一系列的资金。（我们非常重视圣经中的那句“生养众多”）

Last year See’s sales were $383 million, and pre-tax profits were $82 million. The capital now required to run the business is $40 million. This means we have had to reinvest only $32 million since 1972 to handle the modest physical growth – and somewhat immodest financial growth – of the business. In the meantime pre-tax earnings have totaled $1.35 billion. All of that, except for the $32 million, has been sent to Berkshire (or, in the early years, to Blue Chip). After paying corporate taxes on the profits, we have used the rest to buy other attractive businesses. Just as Adam and Eve kick-started an activity that led to six billion humans, See’s has given birth to multiple new streams of cash for us. (The biblical command to “be fruitful and multiply” is one we take seriously at Berkshire.)

像喜诗糖果这样的美国公司并不多。一般来说，一家公司如果从利润500万的公司发展到8200万需要大约4亿的资本投入。这是因为增长阶段的公司需要和销量相对应的经营资本，以及相关的固定资产投资。

There aren’t many See’s in Corporate America. Typically, companies that increase their earnings from $5 million to $82 million require, say, $400 million or so of capital investment to finance their growth. That’s because growing businesses have both working capital needs that increase in proportion to sales growth and significant requirements for fixed asset investments.

一个需要大幅增加资本投入来进行增长的公司可以被认为是理想的投资。在下一个例子中可以看到，从4亿有形净资产中获得每年8200万的税前收入并不是什么见不得人的事情。但是这样的模式对于喜诗糖果而言是截然不同的。在几乎没有重大资本要求的情况下获得一个不断增长的现金流要终究是好得多。比如微软和谷歌。

A company that needs large increases in capital to engender its growth may well prove to be a satisfactory investment. There is, to follow through on our example, nothing shabby about earning $82 million pre-tax on $400 million of net tangible assets. But that equation for the owner is vastly different from the See’s situation. It’s far better to have an ever-increasing stream of earnings with virtually no major capital requirements. Ask Microsoft or Google.

良好的商业模式 THE GOOD

一个良好的，但不至于激动人心的商业模式的例子就是我们的飞行安全培训公司。这个公司给客户提供的帮助能力和我所知道的其他任何公司能做到的一样好。它同时还具有着一个长久的竞争优势：去一个不是行业最优秀的飞行训练中心上课就像是出于省钱的目的而选择成功率更低的手术。

One example of good, but far from sensational, business economics is our own FlightSafety. This company delivers benefits to its customers that are the equal of those delivered by any business that I know of. It also possesses a durable competitive advantage: Going to any other flight-training provider than the best is like taking the low bid on a surgical procedure.

尽管如此，这样的商业模式需要大量的资本再投资来支持它的发展。当我们在1996收购飞行安全培训公司时，那一年的税前收益是1.11亿，固定资产的净投入是5.70亿。从我们收购的那一天开始算起，折旧累计的成本达到了9.23亿。但是资本资产共计是16.35亿，而这其中的大部分都用在了购买新机型相应的飞行模拟器上了。（每一个模拟器的价格都在1200万以上，而我们一共有273台模拟器。）我们的固定资产，除去折旧，现在达到了10.79亿。在2007年的税前经营收入是2.70亿，相对于1996年来说增长了1.59个亿。基于我们至今投入的5.09亿资金而言，这样的增长给了我们良好的，但是远没有喜诗糖果般的收入。

Nevertheless, this business requires a significant reinvestment of earnings if it is to grow. When we purchased FlightSafety in 1996, its pre-tax operating earnings were $111 million, and its net investment in fixed assets was $570 million. Since our purchase, depreciation charges have totaled $923 million. But capital expenditures have totaled $1.635 billion, most of that for simulators to match the new airplane models that are constantly being introduced. (A simulator can cost us more than $12 million, and we have 273 of them.) Our fixed assets, after depreciation, now amount to $1.079 billion. Pre-tax operating earnings in 2007 were $270 million, a gain of $159 million since 1996. That gain gave us a good, but far from See’s-like, return on our incremental investment of $509 million.

相应的，如果仅从经济利益出发，飞行安全培训公司使用的一个优秀的但不是杰出的商业模式。它这样收入和支出呈正比的情况也是大多数企业面临的情况。比如说，我们所拥有的大量公共事业方面投资统统都算作这个分类。我们在十年后会收获更多更多的收益，但这样的前提是我们需要额外的数十亿投资。

Consequently, if measured only by economic returns, FlightSafety is an excellent but not extraordinary business. Its put-up-more-to-earn-more experience is that faced by most corporations. For example, our large investment in regulated utilities falls squarely in this category. We will earn considerably more money in this business ten years from now, but we will invest many billions to make it.

糟糕的商业模式 THE GRUESOME

现在轮到糟糕的商业模式。最糟糕的商业模式是那些增长迅速，需要巨大资本维持增速，而最后几乎不赚钱的模式。航空公司就是一个例子。在这个行业，长久的竞争优势在莱特兄弟发明飞机的那天开始就没有存在过。实际上，假使有那么一个富有远见资本家在莱特兄弟试飞的那天路过北卡罗来纳州的基蒂霍克县，那么他应该做的是立刻将弟弟威尔伯·莱特驾驶的飞机一枪打落，避免未来的资本家们络绎不绝的在航空行业烧钱。

Now let’s move to the gruesome. The worst sort of business is one that grows rapidly, requires significant capital to engender the growth, and then earns little or no money. Think airlines. Here a durable competitive advantage has proven elusive ever since the days of the Wright Brothers. Indeed, if a farsighted capitalist had been present at Kitty Hawk, he would have done his successors a huge favor by shooting Orville down.

航空行业自从莱特兄弟的第一次试飞后就处于供不应求的状态。受其行业增长率所吸引，投资者们不断地往这个无底洞倾泻资本。而值得我羞愧的是，我曾在1989年让伯克希尔参与过这样愚蠢的行为：买下全美航空的优先股。当我在支票上的签名笔迹尚未干透之前，公司的经营情况就开始俯冲而下。没过多久，全美航空就没有办法向我们持有的优先股支付股息。但是我们随后非常幸运。市场再一次突然对航空行业的前景感到乐观，哪怕实际上是只是假象。我们随后将我们持有的优先股以巨大的溢价卖出。在我们卖出以后的十年，全美航空还破产过两次。

The airline industry’s demand for capital ever since that first flight has been insatiable. Investors have poured money into a bottomless pit, attracted by growth when they should have been repelled by it. And I, to my shame, participated in this foolishness when I had Berkshire buy U.S. Air preferred stock in 1989. As the ink was drying on our check, the company went into a tailspin, and before long our preferred dividend was no longer being paid. But we then got very lucky. In one of the recurrent, but always misguided, bursts of optimism for airlines, we were actually able to sell our shares in 1998 for a hefty gain. In the decade following our sale, the company went bankrupt. Twice.

总体而言，你可以把这三种商业模式想象成三种类型的定期存款。优秀的存款类型能为你带来丰厚的，逐年增长的利息。不错的那一类能给原有的资金和后来的存款带来不错的利息。糟糕的那一类不仅只支付微薄的利息，而且还要求你反复存钱。

To sum up, think of three types of “savings accounts.” The great one pays an extraordinarily high interest rate that will rise as the years pass. The good one pays an attractive rate of interest that will be earned also on deposits that are added. Finally, the gruesome account both pays an inadequate interest rate and requires you to keep adding money at those disappointing returns.

我现在是时候和大家坦白我过去犯下的错误了。需要注意的是在接下来我描述的几个错误里，没有咨询团队，董事会，或者券商的怂恿。用网球的术语说，这些错误属于非受迫性失误。

And now it’s confession time. It should be noted that no consultant, board of directors or investment banker pushed me into the mistakes I will describe. In tennis parlance, they were all unforced errors.

首先，我差点错过了喜诗糖果的收购机会。卖家的提出的价格是3000万，我当时坚定的说不会超过2500万。幸运的是，他妥协了。否则，考虑到当时我是不会妥协的，那13.5亿可能已经进了别人的口袋里。

To begin with, I almost blew the See’s purchase. The seller was asking $30 million, and I was adamant about not going above $25 million. Fortunately, he caved. Otherwise I would have balked, and that $1.35 billion would have gone to somebody else.

大概是刚好是收购喜诗糖果的那段时期，汤姆·墨菲，在未来是大都会广播公司的CEO，在那时和我打电话给我一份将全国广播公司在达拉斯-沃思堡分部以3500万卖给我的提议。该分部曾收购了沃思堡报纸，但是由于“跨所有制”规则墨菲不得不分拆。我当时知道电视广播站就像喜诗糖果的商业模式一样，几乎不需要资本投入，而且有着出色的增长前景。经营他们的难度很低而且能为股东带来海量的收益。

About the time of the See’s purchase, Tom Murphy, then running Capital Cities Broadcasting, called and offered me the Dallas-Fort Worth NBC station for $35 million. The station came with the Fort Worth paper that Capital Cities was buying, and under the “cross-ownership” rules Murph had to divest it. I knew that TV stations were See’s-like businesses that required virtually no capital investment and had excellent prospects for growth. They were simple to run and showered cash on their owners.

更多的，墨菲，正如和我现在的关系一样，当时和我已经是好友。我敬重他杰出的管理能力和优秀人格。他对于电视广播经营的了解非常透彻。在他没有十足把握交易是对我有利的情况下是不会给我打电话的。基本上相当于，墨菲在暗示我出手买下电视台。但是我拒绝了。

Moreover, Murph, then as now, was a close friend, a man I admired as an extraordinary manager and outstanding human being. He knew the television business forward and backward and would not have called me unless he felt a purchase was certain to work. In effect Murph whispered “buy” into my ear. But I didn’t listen.

在2006年，电视台的税前收益是7300万。也就是说自从我拒绝那项提议以后算起一共产生了至少10亿的收益，而这其中几乎所有都是可以用于其他商业活动的流动资金。并且，其物业的价值现在大约有8亿美金了。为什么我会说“不”？唯一的解释是我的大脑当时在放假，而且忘了提醒我。（我的行为就像是政客莫利·艾文斯曾说过的那样：“如果他的智商还会下降，那么你应该记得每天往他头上浇两次水。”）

In 2006, the station earned $73 million pre-tax, bringing its total earnings since I turned down the deal to at least $1 billion – almost all available to its owner for other purposes. Moreover, the property now has a capital value of about $800 million. Why did I say “no”? The only explanation is that my brain had gone on vacation and forgot to notify me. (My behavior resembled that of a politician Molly Ivins once described: “If his I.Q. was any lower, you would have to water him twice a day.”)

最后，我还犯了一个更加严重的错误。那就是我对德克斯特的交易说“是”。1993年我以价值为4.33亿的伯克希尔股票（共计25203份A级股）收购德克斯特鞋业。我当时认为是持久的竞争优势在收购后的几年就随即消失。但是这只是错误的开始：因为我使用了伯克希尔的股票，这项错误也因此产生了巨大的复利。这一做法对于伯克希尔的股东产生的损失不仅仅只是4亿了，而是35亿。这相当于，我将一个现在价值是2200亿的优秀公司的1.6%股份卖给了一个并没有价值的公司。

Finally, I made an even worse mistake when I said “yes” to Dexter, a shoe business I bought in 1993 for $433 million in Berkshire stock (25,203 shares of A). What I had assessed as durable competitive advantage vanished within a few years. But that’s just the beginning: By using Berkshire stock, I compounded this error hugely. That move made the cost to Berkshire shareholders not $400 million, but rather $3.5 billion. In essence, I gave away 1.6% of a wonderful business – one now valued at $220 billion – to buy a worthless business.

至今为止，德克斯特是我最失败的交易。但是我还会在未来犯更多的错误。你甚至可以赌我会这么做。巴比·贝尔的一首乡村歌曲中有一句很好地解释了人们为什么会在商业收购中犯错：“我从未和一个丑女人上床睡觉，但是我相信我有那么几次是在丑女人身边醒来的。”

To date, Dexter is the worst deal that I’ve made. But I’ll make more mistakes in the future – you can bet on that. A line from Bobby Bare’s country song explains what too often happens with acquisitions: “I’ve never gone to bed with an ugly woman, but I’ve sure woke up with a few.”