巴菲特：通货膨胀如何欺骗股权投资者 How inflation swindles the equity investor

时间：1977年5月

来源：[Fortune](https://fortune.com/2011/06/12/buffett-how-inflation-swindles-the-equity-investor-fortune-classics-1977/)

原文标题：How inflation swindles the equity investor

https://fortune.com/2011/06/12/buffett-how-inflation-swindles-the-equity-investor-fortune-classics-1977/

编者注：每周日，财富杂志都会从我们的档案中发布一篇最喜欢的故事。随着争议围绕着美联储主席本·伯南克是否低估了通货膨胀预期，我们回顾了1977年5月的及时建议，来自沃伦·巴菲特。奥马哈先知与伯南克在通货膨胀问题上一次又一次地发生冲突，这里巴菲特警告说，上涨的价格会阻碍经济增长“不是因为市场下跌，而是尽管市场上涨。”

Editor’s Note: Every Sunday, Fortune publishes a favorite story from our archive. As controversy swirls around whether Fed Chair Ben Bernanke is downplaying inflation predictions, we turn back to May 1977 for timely advice from Warren Buffett. The Oracle of Omaha has clashed with Bernanke over inflation time and time again, and here Buffett warns how rising prices can hamper growth “not because the market falls, but in spite of the fact that the market rises.”

众所周知，股票和债券在通货膨胀的环境中表现不佳。过去十年的大部分时间，我们就处在这样的环境中，这对股市来说确实是一段困难的时期。但是，股市在这段时期遇到的问题的原因仍然不太清楚。

It is no longer a secret that stocks, like bonds, do poorly in an inflationary environment. We have been in such an environment for most of the past decade, and it has indeed been a time of troubles for stocks. But the reasons for the stock market’s problems in this period are still imperfectly understood.

在通货膨胀时代，债券持有者的问题并不神秘。当美元的价值每个月都在下降时，一种以这些美元为收入和本金支付的证券不会是一个大赢家。你几乎不需要一个经济学博士来弄清楚这一点。

There is no mystery at all about the problems of bondholders in an era of inflation. When the value of the dollar deteriorates month after month, a security with income and principal payments denominated in those dollars isn’t going to be a big winner. You hardly need a Ph.D. in economics to figure that one out.

为什么事情没有按照这样的方式发展呢？我认为主要原因是，从经济实质上看，股票和债券非常相似。

And why didn’t it turn out that way? The main reason, I believe, is that stocks, in economic substance, are really very similar to bonds.

我知道这种信念对许多投资者来说会显得古怪。他们会立刻指出，债券的回报（票息）是固定的，而股权投资的回报（公司的盈利）则可能从一年到另一年有很大的变化。这是事实。但是任何一个研究过战后公司总体回报的人都会发现一个非凡的事实：实际上，股本回报并没有太大的变化。

I know that this belief will seem eccentric to many investors. They will immediately observe that the return on a bond (the coupon) is fixed, while the return on an equity investment (the company’s earnings) can vary substantially from one year to another. True enough. But anyone who examines the aggregate returns that have been earned by companies during the postwar years will discover something extraordinary: the returns on equity have in fact not varied much at all.

息票是有粘性的 The coupon is sticky

战后的前10年——即截至1955年的十年间——道琼斯工业指数的年末股权平均年回报率为12.8%。第二个十年，这个数字是10.1%。第三个十年，它是10.9%。一个更大的样本，财富500强（其历史只能追溯到20世纪50年代中期），显示了类似的结果：截至1965年的十年间，回报率为11.2%，截至1975年的十年间，回报率为11.8%。少数几年的数据要高得多（500强的最高值是1974年的14.1%）或低得多（1958年和1970年是9.5%），但多年来，在总体上，账面价值的回报率往往会回归到12%左右的水平。无论是在通货膨胀的年份（或者说在物价稳定的年份），这一水平都没有明显超过。

In the first 10 years after the war — the decade ending in 1955 — the Dow Jones industrials had an average annual return on year-end equity of 12.8%. In the second decade, the figure was 10.1%. In the third decade it was 10.9%. Data for a larger universe, the Fortune 500 (whose history goes back only to the mid-1950s), indicate somewhat similar results: 11.2% in the decade ending in 1965, 11.8% in the decade through 1975. The figures for a few exceptional years have been substantially higher (the high for the 500 was 14.1% in 1974) or lower (9.5% in 1958 and 1970), but over the years, and in the aggregate, the return in book value tends to keep coming back to a level around 12%. It shows no signs of exceeding that level significantly in inflationary years (or in years of stable prices, for that matter).

我们暂时把这些公司，不是当作上市股票，而是当作生产企业。我们也假设这些企业的所有者是以账面价值购买的。在这种情况下，他们自己的回报率也会在12%左右。而且由于回报率非常稳定，把它看作是一个“股权票息”似乎是合理的。

For the moment, let’s think of those companies, not as listed stocks, but as productive enterprises. Let’s also assume that the owners of those enterprises had acquired them at book value. In that case, their own return would have been around 12% too. And because the return has been so consistent, it seems reasonable to think of it as an “equity coupon.”

在现实世界中，当然，投资股票的人不只是买了就不管。相反，许多人试图智胜同行，以便最大化自己的企业收益份额。这种无效的折腾，对股息券没有任何影响，但却降低了投资者的收益份额，因为他们承担了相当大的摩擦成本，如咨询费和经纪费。再加上一个活跃的期权市场，它对美国企业的生产力没有任何贡献，但却需要数千人来经营赌场，摩擦成本就更高了。

In the real world, of course, investors in stocks don’t just buy and hold. Instead, many try to outwit their fellow investors in order to maximize their own proportions of corporate earnings. This thrashing about, obviously fruitless in aggregate, has no impact on the equity coupon but reduces the investor’s portion of it, because he incurs substantial frictional costs, such as advisory fees and brokerage charges. Throw in an active options market, which adds nothing to the productivity of American enterprise but requires a cast of thousands to man the casino, and frictional costs rise further.

股票是永续的 Stocks are perpetual

它也是真的，在现实世界中，投资股票的人通常不能以账面价值买入。有时他们能够以低于账面价值的价格买入；但通常情况下，他们不得不支付高于账面价值的价格，而当这种情况发生时，对那12%的回报就有进一步的压力。我稍后会再谈这些关系。与此同时，让我们关注主要的一点：随着通货膨胀的增加，股本资本的回报并没有增加。从本质上讲，那些购买股票的人得到的证券具有与购买债券的人相同的固定回报。

It is also true that in the real world investors in stocks don’t usually get to buy at book value. Sometimes they have been able to buy in below book; usually, however, they’ve had to pay more than book, and when that happens there is further pressure on that 12%. I’ll talk more about these relationships later. Meanwhile, let’s focus on the main point: as inflation has increased, the return on equity capital has not. Essentially, those who buy equities receive securities with an underlying fixed return just like those who buy bonds.

当然，债券和股票之间有一些重要的区别。首先，债券最终会到期。这可能需要很长时间的等待，但最终债券投资者可以重新谈判他的合同条款。如果当前和预期的通货膨胀率使他的旧票息看起来不够，他可以拒绝继续参与，除非目前提供的票息能重新激发他的兴趣。近年来，这种情况一直在发生。

Of course, there are some important differences between the bond and stock forms. For openers, bonds eventually come due. It may require a long wait, but eventually the bond investor gets to renegotiate the terms of his contract. If current and prospective rates of inflation make his old coupon look inadequate, he can refuse to play further unless coupons currently being offered rekindle his interest. Something of this sort has been going on in recent years.

股票，另一方面，是永久性的。它们的到期日是无限的。股票投资者必须接受美国企业所赚取的回报。如果美国企业注定要赚取12%，那么这就是投资者必须学会接受的水平。作为一个整体，股票投资者既不能选择退出，也不能重新协商。总体而言，他们的承诺实际上是在增加的。个别公司可以出售或清算，公司也可以回购自己的股份；但总的来说，新的股权发行和留存收益保证了被锁定在企业系统中的股权资本会增加。所以，债券形式得了一分。债券息票最终会被重新协商；股权“息票”则不会。当然，很长一段时间以来，12%的息票似乎并不需要太多的修正。

Stocks, on the other hand, are perpetual. They have a maturity date of infinity. Investors in stocks are stuck with whatever return corporate America happens to earn. If corporate America is destined to earn 12%, then that is the level investors must learn to live with. As a group, stock investors can neither opt out nor renegotiate. In the aggregate, their commitment is actually increasing. Individual companies can be sold or liquidated and corporations can repurchase their own shares; on balance, however, new equity flotations and retained earnings guarantee that the equity capital locked up in the corporate system will increase. So, score one for the bond form. Bond coupons eventually will be renegotiated; equity “coupons” won’t. It is true, of course, that for a long time a 12% coupon did not appear in need of a whole lot of correction.

债券持有人可以获得现金 The bondholder gets it in cash

有一种普通债券和我们新的奇异的12%“股权债券”之间的另一个主要区别，这种股权债券穿着股票证书来到华尔街化妆舞会。在通常情况下，债券投资者以现金形式收到他的全部息票，并留给他自己尽力重新投资。相比之下，我们的股票投资者的股权息票部分被公司保留，并以公司正在赚取的任何利率进行再投资。换句话说，回到我们的公司宇宙，每年赚取的12%中的一部分以股息形式支付，余额则重新投入到宇宙中，也赚取12%。

There is another major difference between the garden variety of bond and our new exotic 12% “equity bond” that comes to the Wall Street costume ball dressed in a stock certificate. In the usual case, a bond investor receives his entire coupon in cash and is left to reinvest it as best he can. Our stock investor’s equity coupon, in contrast, is partially retained by the company and is reinvested at whatever rates the company happens to be earning. In other words, going back to our corporate universe, part of the 12% earned annually is paid out in dividends and the balance is put right back into the universe to earn 12% also.

过去的好日子 The good old days

股票的这种特点——部分利息的再投资——可能是好消息，也可能是坏消息，这取决于那12%的相对吸引力。在20世纪50年代和60年代初，这个消息非常好。当债券只有3%或4%的收益时，自动以12%的利率再投资部分股息的权利是非常有价值的。请注意，投资者不能只投资他们自己的钱，得到那12%的回报。在这个时期，股票价格远高于账面价值，投资者被他们必须支付的溢价所阻止，无法直接从底层的公司宇宙中提取出该宇宙所赚取的任何利率。你不能为一张12%的债券支付远高于面值的价格，并为自己赚取12%。

This characteristic of stocks — the reinvestment of part of the coupon — can be good or bad news, depending on the relative attractiveness of that 12%. The news was very good indeed in the 1950s and early 1960s. With bonds yielding only 3 or 4%, the right to reinvest automatically a portion of the equity coupon at 12% was of enormous value. Note that investors could not just invest their own money and get that 12% return. Stock prices in this period ranged far above book value, and investors were prevented by the premium prices they had to pay from directly extracting out of the underlying corporate universe whatever rate that universe was earning. You can’t pay far above par for a 12% bond and earn 12% for yourself.

但是在他们保留的收益上，投资者可以赚取12%的回报。实际上，留存收益使投资者能够以账面价值购买部分企业，而在当时存在的经济环境中，这部分企业的价值远远超过了账面价值。

But on their retained earnings, investors could earn 12%. In effect, earnings retention allowed investors to buy at book value part of an enterprise that, in the economic environment then existing, was worth a great deal more than book value.

这是一种让现金股息几乎没有优势，而留存收益却有很大好处的情况。事实上，投资者认为有可能以12%的利率再投资的钱越多，他们就越珍视他们的再投资权利，也就越愿意为此付出高价。在20世纪60年代初，投资者急切地为位于增长地区的电力公用事业公司支付高价，因为他们知道这些公司有能力再投资很大比例的收益。而那些经营环境要求更多现金分红的公用事业公司则获得较低的价格。

It was a situation that left very little to be said for cash dividends and a lot to be said for earnings retention. Indeed, the more money that investors thought likely to be reinvested at the 12% rate, the more valuable they considered their reinvestment privilege, and the more they were willing to pay for it. In the early 19601s, investors eagerly paid top-scale prices for electric utilities situated in growth areas, knowing that these companies had the ability to re-invest very large proportions of their earnings. Utilities whose operating environment dictated a larger cash payout rated lower prices.

如果在这段时间里，存在一种高级、不可赎回、长期的债券，其票面利率为12%，那么它的价格就会远高于面值。而如果它还有另一种不寻常的特征——即大部分的票息可以自动以面值的价格再投资于类似的债券——那么这种债券就会有更高的溢价。从本质上讲，保留大部分收益的成长股就代表了这样一种证券。当它们对新增股本的再投资率为12%，而一般的利率大约为4%时，投资者就会非常高兴——当然，他们也会付出高昂的价格。

If, during this period, a high-grade, noncallable, long-term bond with a 12% coupon had existed, it would have sold far above par. And if it were a bond with a further unusual characteristic — which was that most of the coupon payments could be automatically reinvested at par in similar bonds — the issue would have commanded an even greater premium. In essence, growth stocks retaining most of their earnings represented just such a security. When their reinvestment rate on the added equity capital was 12% while interest rates generally were around 4%, investors became very happy — and, of course, they paid happy prices.

寻找出口 Heading for the exits

回顾过去，股票投资者可以认为自己在1946-66年期间享受了一份真正丰厚的三重奖励。首先，他们受益于公司内在的股本回报率远高于当前的利率。其次，其中相当一部分回报被以其他方式无法达到的利率为他们再投资。第三，随着前两个好处被广泛认识到，他们得到了对内在股本资本的不断升值的评估。这第三重奖励意味着，除了公司以其股本资本赚取的基本12%左右的回报外，投资者还获得了一个额外的奖励，因为道琼斯工业指数从1946年的账面价值的133%上升到1966年的220%。这样一个标价过程暂时让投资者获得了超过他们所投资的企业内在盈利能力的回报。

Looking back, stock investors can think of themselves in the 1946-66 period as having been ladled a truly bountiful triple dip. First, they were the beneficiaries of an underlying corporate return on equity that was far above prevailing interest rates. Second, a significant portion of that return was reinvested for them at rates that were otherwise unattainable. And third, they were afforded an escalating appraisal of underlying equity capital as the first two benefits became widely recognized. This third dip meant that, on top of the basic 12% or so earned by corporations on their equity capital, investors were receiving a bonus as the Dow Jones industrials increased in price from 133% of book value in 1946 to 220% in 1966. Such a marking-up process temporarily allowed investors to achieve a return that exceeded the inherent earning power of the enterprises in which they had invested.

这种天堂般的情况终于在20世纪60年代中期被许多主要的投资机构“发现”。但正当这些金融大象开始互相踩踏，争相投资股票时，我们进入了一个加速通货膨胀和利率上升的时代。相当合理地，标价过程开始逆转。上升的利率无情地降低了所有现有固定票息投资的价值。而随着长期公司债券利率开始上升（最终达到10%左右），12%的股权回报和再投资“特权”就开始显得不同了。

This heaven-on-earth situation finally was “discovered” in the mid-1960s by many major investing institutions. But just as these financial elephants began trampling on one another in their rush to equities, we entered an era of accelerating inflation and higher interest rates. Quite logically, the marking-up process began to reverse itself. Rising interest rates ruthlessly reduced the value of all existing fixed-coupon investments. And as long-term corporate bond rates began moving up (eventually reaching the 10% area), both the equity return of 12% and the reinvestment “privilege” began to look different.

股票被认为比债券风险更高。虽然股票的收益在一定时间内基本固定，但它每年会有些波动。投资者对未来的态度可能会受到这些年度变化的很大影响，尽管这些变化往往是错误的。股票也更有风险，因为它们具有无限的到期期限。（即使是你友好的经纪人，如果他有任何可用的债券，也不会有胆量把一张100年期的债券当作“安全”的东西来兜售。）由于风险增加了，投资者的自然反应是期望股票的回报率高于债券的回报率——而12%的股票回报率相对于同一企业领域发行的债券的10%的回报率似乎并不令人满意。随着利差缩小，股票投资者开始寻找出路。

Stocks are quite properly thought of as riskier than bonds. While that equity coupon is more or less fixed over periods of time, it does fluctuate somewhat from year to year. Investors’ attitudes about the future can be affected substantially, although frequently erroneously, by those yearly changes. Stocks are also riskier because they come equipped with infinite maturities. (Even your friendly broker wouldn’t have the nerve to peddle a 100-year bond, if he had any available, as “safe.”) Because of the additional risk, the natural reaction of investors is to expect an equity return that is comfortably above the bond return — and 12% on equity versus, say, 10% on bonds issued by the same corporate universe does not seem to qualify as comfortable. As the spread narrows, equity investors start looking for the exits.

但是，当然，他们作为一个群体是无法退出的。他们所能做到的只是大量的转换，造成相当大的摩擦成本，以及一个新的、更低的估值水平，反映了在通货膨胀条件下12%的股权票息的降低吸引力。债券投资者在过去十年中经历了一连串的震惊，在发现任何给定票息水平都没有魔力的过程中：无论是6%、8%还是10%，债券仍然可能暴跌。股票投资者，他们通常不知道他们也有一个“票息”，仍然在接受这一点的教育。

But, of course, as a group they can’t get out. All they can achieve is a lot of movement, substantial frictional costs, and a new, much lower level of valuation, reflecting the lessened attractiveness of the 12% equity coupon under inflationary conditions. Bond investors have had a succession of shocks over the past decade in the course of discovering that there is no magic attached to any given coupon level: at 6%, or 8%, or 10%, bonds can still collapse in price. Stock investors, who are in general not aware that they too have a “coupon,” are still receiving their education on this point.

提高收益的五种方法 Five ways to improve earnings

我们真的必须把12%的股本息率视为不变吗？有没有什么法律规定，企业对股本资本的回报率不能根据永久性的平均通货膨胀率而向上调整？当然没有这样的法律。另一方面，美国企业不能凭愿望或命令来增加收益。要提高股本回报率，企业至少需要以下一项：（1）提高周转率，即销售额与业务中使用的总资产之间的比率；（2）更便宜的杠杆；（3）更多的杠杆；（4）更低的所得税；（5）更宽的销售毛利率。

Must we really view that 12% equity coupon as immutable? Is there any law that says the corporate return on equity capital cannot adjust itself upward in response to a permanently higher average rate of inflation? There is no such law, of course. On the other hand, corporate America cannot increase earnings by desire or decree. To raise that return on equity, corporations would need at least one of the following: (1) an increase in turnover, i.e., in the ratio between sales and total assets employed in the business; (2) cheaper leverage; (3) more leverage; (4) lower income taxes; (5) wider operating margins on sales.

就这些了。增加普通股的回报率就没有其他方法了。让我们看看能用这些方法做些什么。

And that’s it. There simply are no other ways to increase returns on common equity. Let’s see what can be done with these.

我们从周转率开始。在这个练习中，我们要考虑的三大类资产是应收账款、存货和固定资产，如厂房和机器。

We’ll begin with turnover. The three major categories of assets we have to think about for this exercise are accounts receivable, inventories, and fixed assets such as plants and machinery.

销售额增加时，应收账款也会按比例增加，无论销售额的增加是由更多的实物量还是由通货膨胀造成的。这里没有改进的空间。

Accounts receivable go up proportionally as sales go up, whether the increase in dollar sales is produced by more physical volume or by inflation. No room for improvement here.

存货的情况就不那么简单了。从长期来看，单位存货的趋势可以预期会跟随单位销售的趋势。但是，从短期来看，物理周转率可能会因为一些特殊因素而波动——例如，成本预期或瓶颈。

With inventories, the situation is not quite so simple. Over the long term, the trend in unit inventories may be expected to follow the trend in unit sales. Over the short term, however, the physical turnover rate may bob around because of special influences — e.g., cost expectations, or bottlenecks.

使用后进先出（LIFO）存货计价方法可以在通货膨胀时期提高报告的周转率。当美元销售额因为通货膨胀而上升时，LIFO公司的存货估值要么保持不变（如果单位销售量没有上升），要么落后于美元销售额的上升（如果单位销售量有上升）。在这两种情况下，美元周转率都会增加。

The use of last-in, first-out (LIFO) inventory-valuation methods serves to increase the reported turnover rate during inflationary times. When dollar sales are rising because of inflation, inventory valuations of a LIFO company either will remain level (if unit sales are not rising) or will trail the rise in dollar sales (if unit sales are rising). In either case, dollar turnover will increase.

在20世纪70年代初，公司向LIFO会计（这会降低公司的报告收益和税单）的转变有了明显的趋势。这种趋势现在似乎已经放缓。不过，由于存在很多LIFO公司，再加上可能还有一些其他公司加入这个行列，可以确保存货的报告周转率还会有进一步的增加。

During the early 1970s, there was a pronounced swing by corporations toward LIFO accounting (which has the effect of lowering a company’s reported earnings and tax bills). The trend now seems to have slowed. Still, the existence of a lot of LIFO companies, plus the likelihood that some others will join the crowd, ensures some further increase in the reported turnover of inventory.

收益可能很微薄 The gains are apt to be modest

对于固定资产来说，假设通货膨胀率影响所有产品的程度相同，那么通货膨胀率的上升最初会导致营业额增加。这是因为销售额会立即反映新的价格水平，而固定资产账户则只会逐渐反映这种变化，即在现有资产被淘汰并以新价格替换时。显然，公司替换资产的速度越慢，营业额比率就会越高。但是，这种行为在完成一个替换周期后就会停止。假设通货膨胀率保持不变，销售额和固定资产将以通货膨胀率的速度同步上升。

In the case of fixed assets, any rise in the inflation rate, assuming it affects all products equally, will initially have the effect of increasing turnover. That is true because sales will immediately reflect the new price level, while the fixed asset account will reflect the change only gradually, i.e., as existing assets are retired and replaced at the new prices. Obviously, the more slowly a company goes about this replacement process, the more the turnover ratio will rise. The action stops, however, when a replacement cycle is completed. Assuming a constant rate of inflation, sales and fixed assets will then begin to rise in concert at the rate of inflation.

总之，通货膨胀会带来一些营业额比率的提高。由于采用了后进先出法（LIFO），一些改善是肯定的；而如果通货膨胀加速，由于销售额比固定资产上升得更快，一些改善也是可能的。但是，收益可能很微薄，并不足以显著提高股本资本的回报率。在截至1975年的十年间，尽管通货膨胀普遍加速，并且广泛采用了后进先出法（LIFO）会计，财富500强的营业额比率只从1.18/1上升到1.29/1。

To sum up, inflation will produce some gains in turnover ratios. Some improvement would be certain because of LIFO and some would be possible (if inflation accelerates) because of sales rising more rapidly than fixed assets. But the gains are apt to be modest and not of a magnitude to produce substantial improvement in returns on equity capital. During the decade ending in 1975, despite generally accelerating inflation and the extensive use of LIFO accounting, the turnover ratio of the Fortune 500 went only from 1.18/1 to 1.29/1.

更便宜的杠杆？不太可能。高通胀率通常会导致借贷变得更昂贵，而不是更便宜。飞涨的通胀率造成飞涨的资本需求；而借贷者，随着他们对长期合同越来越不信任，也变得更加苛刻。但即使利率没有进一步上升，杠杆的成本也会变得更高，因为现在企业账面上的债务成本低于替换它们的成本。而替换是必须的，因为现有的债务到期了。总的来说，未来杠杆成本的变化似乎很可能对股本回报率产生轻微的抑制作用。

Cheaper leverage? Not likely. High rates of inflation generally cause borrowing to become dearer, not cheaper. Galloping rates of inflation create galloping capital needs; and lenders, as they become increasingly distrustful of long-term contracts, become more demanding. But even if there is no further rise in interest rates, leverage will be getting more expensive because the average cost of the debt now on corporate books is less than would be the cost of replacing it. And replacement will be required as the existing debt matures. Overall, then, future changes in the cost of leverage seem likely to have a mildly depressing effect on the return on equity.

更多的杠杆？美国企业已经使用了许多，如果不是大部分，曾经可用的更多杠杆子弹。这一命题的证据可以在《财富》500强的一些统计数据中看到：在截至1975年的20年中，500强企业的股东权益占总资产的百分比从63%下降到不到50%。换句话说，现在每一美元的股权资本都比以前有更多的杠杆。

More leverage? American business already has fired many, if not most, of the more-leverage bullets once available to it. Proof of that proposition can be seen in some other Fortune 500 statistics: in the 20 years ending in 1975, stockholders’ equity as a percentage of total assets declined for the 500 from 63% to just under 50%. In other words, each dollar of equity capital now is leveraged much more heavily than it used to be.

借贷者学到了什么 What the lenders learned

通胀引起的金融需求的一个讽刺之处是，利润率最高的公司——通常是最好的信用——相对而言需要较少的债务资本。但是利润率低迷的落后者永远得不到足够的资金。借贷者对这个问题比十年前了解得多得多——并且相应地不太愿意让资金饥渴、利润率低下的企业把自己杠杆化到极致。

An irony of inflation-induced financial requirements is that the highly profitable companies — generally the best credits — require relatively little debt capital. But the laggards in profitability never can get enough. Lenders understand this problem much better than they did a decade ago — and are correspondingly less willing to let capital-hungry, low-profitability enterprises leverage themselves to the sky.

然而，在通货膨胀的条件下，许多公司似乎在未来肯定会采用更多的杠杆，以提高股本回报。他们的管理层会这样做，因为他们将需要大量的资本——往往只是为了做同样的业务量——并且希望在不削减股息或发行股票的情况下获得它，而由于通货膨胀，这些股票不太可能具有吸引力。他们自然的反应是不惜代价地增加债务，就像那些在1960年代争论八分之一点，在1974年感激地找到12%的债务融资的公用事业公司一样。

Nevertheless, given inflationary conditions, many corporations seem sure in the future to turn to still more leverage as a means of shoring up equity returns. Their managements will make that move because they will need enormous amounts of capital — often merely to do the same physical volume of business — and will wish to get it without cutting dividends or making equity offerings that, because of inflation, are not apt to shape up as attractive. Their natural response will be to heap on debt, almost regardless of cost. They will tend to behave like those utility companies that argued over an eighth of a point in the 1960s and were grateful to find 12% debt financing in 1974.

然而，在目前的利率下，增加的债务对股本回报的作用将小于在1960年代初4%利率下增加的债务。还有一个问题是，较高的债务比率会导致信用评级下降，进而导致利息成本进一步上升。

Added debt at present interest rates, however, will do less for equity returns than did added debt at 4% rates in the early 1960s. There is also the problem that higher debt ratios cause credit ratings to be lowered, creating a further rise in interest costs.

因此，这是另一种方式，除了我们已经讨论过的方式之外，杠杆成本将会上升。总体而言，杠杆的高成本可能会抵消杠杆的好处。

So that is another way, to be added to those already discussed, in which the cost of leverage will be rising. In total, the higher costs of leverage are likely to offset the benefits of greater leverage.

此外，在美国企业中已经存在了远远超过传统资产负债表所反映的债务。许多公司有大量与目前员工退休时的工资水平挂钩的养老金义务。在1955-65年低通货膨胀率的情况下，这类计划产生的负债是相当可预测的。今天，没有人真正知道公司最终的义务是什么。但是如果未来通货膨胀率平均为7%，那么现在年薪为12,000美元、加薪不超过生活成本增长的25岁员工，在65岁退休时将赚到180,000美元。

Besides, there is already far more debt in corporate America than is conveyed by conventional balance sheets. Many companies have massive pension obligations geared to whatever pay levels will be in effect when present workers retire. At the low inflation rates of 1955-65, the liabilities arising from such plans were reasonably predictable. Today, nobody can really know the company’s ultimate obligation. But if the inflation rate averages 7% in the future, a 25-year-old employee who is now earning $12,000, and whose raises do no more than match increases in living costs, will be making $180,000 when he retires at 65.

当然，每年在许多年度报告中都有一个非常精确的数字，声称是未偿付养老金负债。如果这个数字真的可信，一个公司只需拿出这笔钱，加上现有的养老金基金资产，把总金额交给一家保险公司，并让它承担所有的现有养老金负债。可惜，在现实世界中，你很难找到一家保险公司愿意听这样的交易。

Of course, there is a marvelously precise figure in many annual reports each year, purporting to be the unfunded pension liability. If that figure were really believable, a corporation could simply ante up that sum, add to it the existing pension-fund assets, turn the total amount over to an insurance company, and have it assume all the corporation’s present pension liabilities. In the real world, alas, it is impossible to find an insurance company willing even to listen to such a deal.

美国几乎每一位企业财务长都会对发行“生活成本”债券（一种与价格指数挂钩的不可赎回债券）感到惊恐。但通过私人养老金制度，美国企业实际上承担了大量相当于这种债券的债务。

Virtually every corporate treasurer in America would recoil at the idea of issuing a “cost-of-living” bond — a noncallable obligation with coupons tied to a price index. But through the private pension system, corporate America has in fact taken on a fantastic amount of debt that is the equivalent of such a bond.

无论是通过传统债务还是与通货膨胀挂钩的“养老金债务”，股东都应该对杠杆持怀疑态度。一个没有债务的企业产生12%的回报，远远优于一个背负沉重债务的企业产生的相同回报。这意味着今天的12%股权回报可能比20年前的12%回报要低。

More leverage, whether through conventional debt or unhooked and indexed “pension debt,” should be viewed with skepticism by shareholders. A 12% return from an enterprise that is debt-free is far superior to the same return achieved by a business hocked to its eyeballs. Which means that today’s 12% equity returns may well be less valuable than the 12% returns of 20 years ago.

纽约更有趣 More fun in New York

降低企业所得税似乎不太可能。投资美国公司的人已经拥有了一种可以被认为是D级股票的东西。A、B和C级股票分别代表联邦、州和市政府的所得税索赔。诚然，这些“投资者”对公司的资产没有任何索赔权；但是，他们却得到了公司收益的很大一部分，包括由D级股东所拥有的部分收益留存所产生的资本增值。

Lower corporate income taxes seem unlikely. Investors in American corporations already own what might be thought of as a Class D stock. The Class A, B, and C stocks are represented by the income-tax claims of the federal, state, and municipal governments. It is true that these “investors” have no claim on the corporation’s assets; however, they get a major share of the earnings, including earnings generated by the equity buildup resulting from retention of part of the earnings owned by the Class D shareholders.

这些精彩的A类、B类和C类股票的另一个迷人的特点是，它们在公司收益中的份额可以立即、大量地增加，而且不需要付款，只要任何一个“股东”类别的单方投票就可以，例如，国会在A类的情况下采取行动。更有趣的是，有时候其中一个类别会投票增加它在业务中的所有权份额，甚至可以追溯到以前——正如1975年在纽约经营的公司惊恐地发现的那样。无论A类、B类或C类“股东”给自己投票了更大的业务份额，剩下的给D类的部分——这是普通投资者持有的那一部分——就会减少。

A further charming characteristic of these wonderful Class A, B, and C stocks is that their share of the corporation’s earnings can be increased immediately, abundantly, and without payment by the unilateral vote of any one of the “stockholder” classes, e.g., by congressional action in the case of the Class A. To add to the fun, one of the classes will sometimes vote to increase its ownership share in the business retroactively — as companies operating in New York discovered to their dismay in 1975. Whenever the Class A, B, or C “stockholders” vote themselves a larger share of the business, the portion remaining for Class D — that’s the one held by the ordinary investor — declines.

展望未来，在长期内假设控制A类、B类或C类股票的人会投票减少自己的收益似乎是不明智的。D类股票可能必须努力维持自己的地位。

Looking ahead, it seems unwise to assume that those who control the A, B, and C shares will vote to reduce their own take over the long run. The Class D shares probably will have to struggle to hold their own.

来自联邦贸易委员会（FTC）的坏消息 Bad news from the FTC

我们五种可能提高股本回报率的来源中的最后一种是更广泛的销售运营利润率。这里是一些乐观主义者希望实现重大收益的地方。他们并没有证明自己是错的。但是，在销售美元中只有100美分，而在我们得到剩余的税前利润之前，有很多对这个美元提出要求。主要索赔人是劳动力、原材料、能源和各种非所得税。这些成本在通货膨胀时代似乎不太可能下降。

The last of our five possible sources of increased returns on equity is wider operating margins on sales. Here is where some optimists would hope to achieve major gains. There is no proof that they are wrong. But there are only 100 cents in the sales dollar and a lot of demands on that dollar before we get down to the residual, pretax profits. The major claimants are labor, raw materials, energy, and various non-income taxes. The relative importance of these costs hardly seems likely to decline during an age of inflation.

最近的统计证据也不支持在通货膨胀时期，利润率会扩大的说法。在1965年结束的十年里，这是一个相对低通胀的时期，联邦贸易委员会每季度报告的制造业公司的平均年度销售税前利润率为8.6%。在1975年结束的十年里，平均利润率为8%。换句话说，尽管通货膨胀率显著提高，但利润率却下降了。

Recent statistical evidence, furthermore, does not inspire confidence in the proposition that margins will widen in a period of inflation. In the decade ending in 1965, a period of relatively low inflation, the universe of manufacturing companies reported on quarterly by the Federal Trade Commission had an average annual pretax margin on sales of 8.6%. In the decade ending in 1975, the average margin was 8%. Margins were down, in other words, despite a very considerable increase in the inflation rate.

如果企业能够根据替代成本来定价，那么在通货膨胀时期，利润率就会扩大。但事实很简单，尽管人们普遍认为大型企业拥有市场力量，但它们却没有做到这一点。替代成本核算几乎总是显示，在过去的十年里，企业的收益显著下降。如果石油、钢铁和铝等主要行业真的拥有人们所认为的寡头垄断力量，那么我们只能得出这样的结论：它们的定价政策非常克制。

If business was able to base its prices on replacement costs, margins would widen in inflationary periods. But the simple fact is that most large businesses, despite a widespread belief in their market power, just don’t manage to pull it off. Replacement cost accounting almost always shows that corporate earnings have declined significantly in the past decade. If such major industries as oil, steel, and aluminum really have the oligopolistic muscle imputed to them, one can only conclude that their pricing policies have been remarkably restrained.

这就是完整的阵容：五个可以提高普通股权益回报率的因素，但根据我的分析，在高通货膨胀时期，它们都不太可能带我们走向这个方向。你可能比我更乐观。但请记住，在12%左右的回报率已经伴随我们很长时间了。

There you have the complete lineup: five factors that can improve returns on common equity, none of which, by my analysis, are likely to take us very far in that direction in periods of high inflation. You may have emerged from this exercise more optimistic than I am. But remember, returns in the 12% area have been with us a long time.

投资者的方程式 The investor’s equation

即使你同意12%的股权息率或多或少是不变的，你仍然可能希望在未来几年里做得很好。这是有可能的。毕竟，很多投资者用它赚了很长时间的钱。但是你未来的结果将受到三个变量的影响：账面价值和市场价值之间的关系，税率和通货膨胀率。

Even if you agree that the 12% equity coupon is more or less immutable, you still may hope to do well with it in the years ahead. It’s conceivable that you will. After all, a lot of investors did well with it for a long time. But your future results will be governed by three variables: the relationship between book value and market value, the tax rate, and the inflation rate.

让我们来看看有关账面价值和市场价值的一些算术。当股票持续以账面价值出售时，一切都很简单。如果一只股票的账面价值是100美元，平均市场价值也是100美元，那么企业12%的收益就会为投资者带来12%的回报（减去那些我们暂时忽略的摩擦成本）。如果派息率是50%，我们的投资者将通过股息获得6美元，另外6美元来自企业账面价值的增加，这当然也会反映在他持有的股票的市场价值上。

Let’s wade through a little arithmetic about book and market value. When stocks consistently sell at book value, it’s all very simple. If a stock has a book value of $100 and also an average market value of $100, 12% earnings by business will produce a 12% return for the investor (less those frictional costs, which we’ll ignore for the moment). If the payout ratio is 50%, our investor will get $6 via dividends and a further $6 from the increase in the book value of the business, which will, of course, be reflected in the market value of his holdings.

如果股票以账面价值的150%出售，情况就会改变。投资者将收到相同的6美元现金股息，但这现在只代表他150美元成本的4%回报。企业的账面价值仍然会增加6%（至106美元），而投资者持有的市值，按照账面价值的150%一致计算，也会相应地增加6%（至159美元）。但投资者的总回报，即来自升值和股息的回报，只有10%，而不是企业赚取的基础12%。

If the stock sold at 150% of book value, the picture would change. The investor would receive the same $6 cash dividend, but it would now represent only a 4% return on his $150 cost. The book value of the business would still increase by 6% (to $106) and the market value of the investor’s holdings, valued consistently at 150% of book value, would similarly increase by 6% (to $159). But the investor’s total return, i.e., from appreciation plus dividends, would be only 10% versus the underlying 12% earned by the business.

当投资者以低于账面价值的价格买入时，过程就反过来了。例如，如果股票以账面价值的80%出售，相同的收益和派息假设将产生7.5%的股息回报（$6在$80的价格上）和6%的升值回报——总回报为13.5%。换句话说，你通过以折扣价买入而不是溢价买入而获得更好的回报，正如常识所告诉你的那样。

When the investor buys in below book value, the process is reversed. For example, if the stock sells at 80% of book value, the same earnings and payout assumptions would yield 7.5% from dividends ($6 on an $80 price) and 6% from appreciation — a total return of 13.5%. In other words, you do better by buying at a discount rather than a premium, just as common sense would suggest.

在战后的年代，道琼斯工业指数的市值曾低至账面价值的84%（1974年），也曾高达232%（1965年）；大部分时间，这个比率都远高于100%。（今年春天初，它大约是110%。）让我们假设，在未来，这个比率将接近100%，意味着股票投资者可以获得全部12%的收益。至少，在税收和通货膨胀之前，他们可以获得这个数字。

During the postwar years, the market value of the Dow Jones industrials has been as low as 84% of book value (in 1974) and as high as 232% (in 1965); most of the time the ratio has been well over 100%. (Early this spring, it was around 110%.) Let’s assume that in the future the ratio will be something close to 100%, meaning that investors in stocks could earn the full 12%. At least, they could earn that figure before taxes and before inflation.

7%的税后收益 7% after taxes

税收会从12%的收益中咬掉多大一块呢？对于个人投资者来说，合理的假设是，联邦、州和地方所得税平均可能会在股息上收取50%，在资本利得上收取30%。大多数投资者的边际税率可能略低于这些数字，但许多持有较大股份的投资者会面临更高的税率。根据新的税法，正如《财富》杂志上个月所观察到的，一个高收入的投资者，在一个税收很重的城市，他的资本利得的边际税率可能高达56%。

How large a bite might taxes take out of the 12%? For individual investors, it seems reasonable to assume that federal, state, and local income taxes will average perhaps 50% on dividends and 30% on capital gains. A majority of investors may have marginal rates somewhat below these, but many with larger holdings will experience substantially higher rates. Under the new tax law, as Fortune observed last month, a high-income investor in a heavily taxed city could have a marginal rate on capital gains as high as 56%.

那么，让我们用50%和30%作为个人投资者的代表。让我们也假设，与近期的经验一致，以12%的股本收益率赚钱的公司支付5%的现金股息（税后2.5%），并保留7%，这些保留的收益产生相应的市值增长（税后30%的4.9%）。那么，税后回报率就是7.4%。可能这应该四舍五入到大约7%，以考虑摩擦成本。为了进一步推进我们的股票作为伪装债券的论点，那么，股票可以被视为个人投资者的7%免税永续债券的等价物。

So let’s use 50% and 30% as representative for individual investors. Let’s also assume, in line with recent experience, that corporations earning 12% on equity pay out 5% in cash dividends (2.5% after tax) and retain 7%, with those retained earnings producing a corresponding market-value growth (4.9% after the 30% tax). The after-tax return, then, would be 7.4%. Probably this should be rounded down to about 7% to allow for frictional costs. To push our stocks-as-disguised-bonds thesis one notch further, then, stocks might be regarded as the equivalent, for individuals, of 7% tax-exempt perpetual bonds.

无人知晓的数字 The number nobody knows

这就引出了一个关键的问题——通货膨胀率。这个问题没有人知道答案——包括那些几年前觉得只要轻轻地在这里那里推一推，失业率和通货膨胀率就会像受过训练的海豹一样听话的政客、经济学家和权威专家。

Which brings us to the crucial question — the inflation rate. No one knows the answer on this one — including the politicians, economists, and Establishment pundits, who felt, a few years back, that with slight nudges here and there unemployment and inflation rates would respond like trained seals.

但是许多迹象似乎对价格稳定不利：通货膨胀现在已经是全球性的；我们社会中主要群体利用他们的选举力量来转移而不是解决经济问题的倾向；如果问题可以推迟，就表现出不愿意解决甚至最重要的问题（例如能源和核扩散）的态度；以及一个政治制度，如果立法者的行为看起来能产生短期利益，即使他们最终的影响将是加剧长期痛苦，也会让他们连任。

But many signs seem negative for stable prices: the fact that inflation is now worldwide; the propensity of major groups in our society to utilize their electoral muscle to shift, rather than solve, economic problems; the demonstrated unwillingness to tackle even the most vital problems (e.g., energy and nuclear proliferation) if they can be postponed; and a political system that rewards legislators with reelection if their actions appear to produce short-term benefits even though their ultimate imprint will be to compound long-term pain.

大多数在政治职位上的人，完全可以理解，他们坚决反对通货膨胀，同时又坚决支持导致通货膨胀的政策。（这种精神分裂并没有让他们失去现实感，然而；国会议员们已经确保了他们的退休金——与私营部门授予的几乎所有退休金不同——在退休后与生活成本变化挂钩。）

Most of those in political office, quite understandably, are firmly against inflation and firmly in favor of policies producing it. (This schizophrenia hasn’t caused them to lose touch with reality, however; Congressmen have made sure that their pensions — unlike practically all granted in the private sector — are indexed to cost-of-living changes after retirement.)

关于未来通货膨胀率的讨论通常探讨货币和财政政策的微妙之处。这些是决定任何特定通货膨胀方程式结果的重要变量。但是，在源头上，和平时期的通货膨胀是一个政治问题，而不是一个经济问题。人类行为，而不是货币行为，是关键。而当非常人性化的政治家在下一次选举和下一代之间做出选择时，通常会发生什么是很明显的。

Discussions regarding future inflation rates usually probe the subtleties of monetary and fiscal policies. These are important variables in determining the outcome of any specific inflationary equation. But, at the source, peacetime inflation is a political problem, not an economic problem. Human, behavior, not monetary behavior, is the key. And when very human politicians choose between the next election and the next generation, it’s clear what usually happens.

这样的宽泛的概括并不能产生精确的数字。但在我看来，未来几年的通货膨胀率很有可能平均为7%。我希望这个预测是错的。而且很可能是。预测通常告诉我们更多的是预测者而不是未来。你可以自由地将你自己的通货膨胀率因素纳入投资者的方程式中。但如果你预见到一个平均2%或3%的率，那么你戴的眼镜和我不一样。

Such broad generalizations do not produce precise numbers. However, it seems quite possible to me that inflation rates will average 7% in future years. I hope this forecast proves to be wrong. And it may well be. Forecasts usually tell us more of the forecaster than of the future. You are free to factor your own inflation rate into the investor’s equation. But if you foresee a rate averaging 2% or 3%, you are wearing different glasses than I am.

所以我们就这样：税前和通货膨胀之前是12%；税后和通货膨胀之前是7%；税后和通货膨胀之后可能是零。这听起来几乎不像是一个能让电视上那些奔跑的牛群持续冲刺的公式。

So there we are: 12% before taxes and inflation; 7% after taxes and before inflation; and maybe zero percent after taxes and inflation. It hardly sounds like a formula that will keep all those cattle stampeding on TV.

作为一个普通股东，你会有更多的美元，但你可能没有更多的购买力。拜拜了，本杰明·富兰克林（“省下一分钱就是赚了一分钱”），迎接米尔顿·弗里德曼（“一个人消费他的资本和投资他的资本没什么区别”）。

As a common stockholder you will have more dollars, but you may have no more purchasing power. Out with Ben Franklin (“a penny saved is a penny earned”) and in with Milton Friedman (“a man might as well consume his capital as invest it”).

寡妇们没有注意到的事情 What widows don’t notice

算术很清楚地表明，通货膨胀是一种比我们的立法机关制定的任何税收都更具破坏性的税收。通货膨胀税有着惊人的消耗资本的能力。对于一个把她的积蓄放在5%存折账户里的寡妇来说，她在零通货膨胀时期对她的利息收入缴纳100%所得税，或者在5%通货膨胀的年份不缴纳任何所得税，这没有什么区别。无论哪种方式，她都被“征税”了一种让她没有任何真正收入的方式。她花的任何钱都是直接从资本中来的。她会觉得120%的所得税是荒谬的，但似乎没有注意到6%的通货膨胀在经济上是等同的。

The arithmetic makes it plain that inflation is a far more devastating tax than anything that has been enacted by our legislatures. The inflation tax has a fantastic ability to simply consume capital. It makes no difference to a widow with her savings in a 5% passbook account whether she pays 100% income tax on her interest income during a period of zero inflation, or pays no income taxes during years of 5% inflation. Either way, she is “taxed” in a manner that leaves her no real income whatsoever. Any money she spends comes right out of capital. She would find outrageous a 120% income tax, but doesn’t seem to notice that 6% inflation is the economic equivalent.

如果我的通货膨胀假设接近正确，令人失望的结果不是因为市场下跌，而是尽管市场上涨。上个月初，道琼斯指数在920点左右，比10年前高出55点。但是按照通货膨胀调整后，道琼斯指数下降了近345点——从865点降到520点。而且，为了达到这样的结果，道琼斯指数的一半收益都必须从它们的所有者那里扣除并重新投资。

If my inflation assumption is close to correct, disappointing results will occur not because the market falls, but in spite of the fact that the market rises. At around 920 early last month, the Dow was up 55 points from where it was 10 years ago. But adjusted for inflation, the Dow is down almost 345 points — from 865 to 520. And about half of the earnings of the Dow had to be withheld from their owners and reinvested in order to achieve even that result.

在未来10年里，道琼斯指数将仅仅由12%的股权票息、40%的股息支付率和目前110%的市净率的组合而翻倍。而如果通货膨胀率为7%，那么在1800点卖出的投资者在缴纳了资本利得税后，仍然会比现在的情况要差得多。

In the next 10 years, the Dow would be doubled just by a combination of the 12% equity coupon, a 40% payout ratio, and the present 110% ratio of market to book value. And with 7% inflation, investors who sold at 1800 would still be considerably worse off than they are today after paying their capital-gains taxes.

我几乎可以听到一些投资者对这些悲观的想法的反应。他们会认为，无论新的投资时代带来了什么困难，他们总能设法为自己获得优异的回报。他们的成功是极不可能的。而且，从总体上讲，当然是不可能的。如果你觉得你可以在证券市场上跳来跳去，以一种可以抵消通货膨胀税的方式，我很乐意做你的经纪人——但不愿意做你的合伙人。

I can almost hear the reaction of some investors to these downbeat thoughts. It will be to assume that, whatever the difficulties presented by the new investment era, they will somehow contrive to turn in superior results for themselves. Their success is most unlikely. And, in aggregate, of course, impossible. If you feel you can dance in and out of securities in a way that defeats the inflation tax, I would like to be your broker — but not your partner.

即使是所谓的免税投资者，如养老基金和大学捐赠基金，也无法逃避通货膨胀税。如果我的7%的通货膨胀率的假设是正确的，那么一所大学的财务主管应该把每年赚到的前7%仅仅看作是购买力的补充。捐赠基金在超越通货膨胀的跑步机之前，是没有任何收益的。在7%的通货膨胀和，比如说，总体投资回报率为8%的情况下，这些认为自己免税的机构，实际上是在支付87.5%的“所得税”。

Even the so-called tax-exempt investors, such as pension funds and college endowment funds, do not escape the inflation tax. If my assumption of a 7% inflation rate is correct, a college treasurer should regard the first 7% earned each year merely as a replenishment of purchasing power. Endowment funds are earning nothing until they have outpaced the inflation treadmill. At 7% inflation and, say, overall investment returns of 8%, these institutions, which believe they are tax-exempt, are in fact paying “income taxes” of 87.5%.

社会方程式 The social equation

不幸的是，高通货膨胀率带来的主要问题不是对投资者，而是对整个社会。投资收入只占国民收入的一小部分，如果人均实际收入能够在零实际投资回报的情况下保持健康的增长，社会正义可能会得到提升。

Unfortunately, the major problems from high inflation rates flow not to investors but to society as a whole. Investment income is a small portion of national income, and if per capita real income could grow at a healthy rate alongside zero real investment returns, social justice might well be advanced.

市场经济给参与者带来了一些不平衡的收益。 声带、解剖结构、体力或智力的正确禀赋可以产生大量关于未来国民产出的索赔支票（股票、债券和其他形式的资本）。 类似地，适当选择祖先可以导致在出生时终生供应此类门票。 如果零实际投资回报将更多的国家产出从这些股东手中转移到同样有价值和勤奋但缺乏中奖人才的公民身上，似乎不太可能对公平的世界构成如此侮辱，以至于冒着神圣干预的风险。

A market economy creates some lopsided payoffs to participants. The right endowment of vocal chords, anatomical structure, physical strength, or mental powers can produce enormous piles of claim checks (stocks, bonds, and other forms of capital) on future national output. Proper selection of ancestors similarly can result in lifetime supplies of such tickets upon birth. If zero real investment returns diverted a bit greater portion of the national output from such stockholders to equally worthy and hardworking citizens lacking jackpot-producing talents, it would seem unlikely to pose such an insult to an equitable world as to risk Divine Intervention.

但是，以牺牲富裕股东为代价，提高工人福利的潜力并不显著。员工报酬已经是分红总额的28倍，而且很多分红现在流向了养老基金、非营利机构如大学，以及并不富裕的个人股东。在这种情况下，如果我们现在把富裕股东的所有分红都转移到工资中——这是我们只能做一次的事情，就像杀掉一头牛（或者，如果你喜欢，一头猪）——我们只能把实际工资提高不到我们过去从一年的经济增长中获得的那么多。

But the potential for real improvement in the welfare of workers at the expense of affluent stockholders is not significant. Employee compensation already totals 28 times the amount paid out in dividends, and a lot of those dividends now go to pension funds, nonprofit institutions such as universities, and individual stockholders who are not affluent. Under these circumstances, if we now shifted all dividends of wealthy stockholders into wages — something we could do only once, like killing a cow (or, if you prefer, a pig) — we would increase real wages by less than we used to obtain from one year’s growth of the economy.

俄罗斯人也明白这一点 The Russians understand it too

因此，通过通货膨胀对他们投资的影响，削弱富裕阶层，甚至不会为那些不富裕的人提供实质性的短期帮助。他们的经济福祉将随着通货膨胀对经济的总体影响而升降。而这些影响很可能不会是好的。

Therefore, diminishment of the affluent, through the impact of inflation on their investments, will not even provide material short-term aid to those who are not affluent. Their economic well-being will rise or fall with the general effects of inflation on the economy. And those effects are not likely to be good.

要想实现经济福祉的大幅增长，就需要在现代生产设施中投入大量的实物资本。如果没有不断创造和使用各行各业昂贵的新资本资产，那么巨大的劳动力供给、巨大的消费者需求和巨大的政府承诺只会导致巨大的挫折。这是一个俄罗斯人和洛克菲勒都能理解的方程式。而且，这也是西德和日本取得惊人成功的方程式。高资本积累率使这些国家的生活水平提高的速度远远超过了我们，即使我们在能源方面拥有更优越的地位。

Large gains in real capital, invested in modern production facilities, are required to produce large gains in economic well-being. Great labor availability, great consumer wants, and great government promises will lead to nothing but great frustration without continuous creation and employment of expensive new capital assets throughout industry. That’s an equation understood by Russians as well as Rockefellers. And it’s one that has been applied with stunning success in West Germany and Japan. High capital-accumulation rates have enabled those countries to achieve gains in living standards at rates far exceeding ours, even though we have enjoyed much the superior position in energy.

要理解通货膨胀对实际资本积累的影响，需要一些数学知识。回到那个12%的股本回报率。这样的收益是在折旧之后计算的，这样假设可以用未来的价格替换现有的生产能力——如果那些工厂和设备可以在未来以与原始成本相似的价格购买的话。

To understand the impact of inflation upon real capital accumulation, a little math is required. Come back for a moment to that 12% return on equity capital. Such earnings are stated after depreciation, which presumably will allow replacement of present productive capacity — if that plant and equipment can be purchased in the future at prices similar to their original cost.

过去的情况 The way it was

假设大约一半的收益用于支付股息，留下6%的股本用于资助未来的增长。如果通货膨胀率很低——比如说2%——那么很大一部分增长就可以是实物产出的实际增长。因为在这种情况下，明年只需要多投资2%的应收账款、存货和固定资产，就可以复制今年的实物产出——留下4%用于投资生产更多实物商品的资产。其中2%用于资助反映通货膨胀的虚幻美元增长，剩下的4%用于资助实际增长。如果人口增长率是1%，那么实物产出的4%增长就相当于人均实际净收入的3%增长。这大致就是我们经济过去发生的情况。

Let’s assume that about half of earnings are paid out in dividends, leaving 6% of equity capital available to finance future growth. If inflation is low — say, 2% — a large portion of that growth can be real growth in physical output. For under these conditions, 2% more will have to be invested in receivables, inventories, and fixed assets next year just to duplicate this year’s physical output — leaving 4% for investment in assets to produce more physical goods. The 2% finances illusory dollar growth reflecting inflation and the remaining 4% finances real growth. If population growth is 1%, the 4% gain in real output translates into a 3% gain in real per capita net income. That, very roughly, is what used to happen in our economy.

现在把通货膨胀率提高到7%，计算出在为强制性通货膨胀部分的融资后，还剩下多少用于实际增长。答案是没有——如果股息政策和杠杆率保持不变。在12%的收益中支付了一半后，还剩下6%，但这些都被征用了，用于提供与去年的实物交易量相同的美元数量。

Now move the inflation rate to 7% and compute what is left for real growth after the financing of the mandatory inflation component. The answer is nothing — if dividend policies and leverage ratios remain unchanged. After half of the 12% earnings are paid out, the same 6% is left, but it is all conscripted to provide the added dollars needed to transact last year’s physical volume of business.

许多公司，在正常支付股息后，没有真正的留存收益来资助实物扩张，就会想办法。他们会问自己，我们怎样才能在不惹恼股东的情况下停止或减少股息呢？我有一个好消息要告诉他们：一套现成的蓝图已经准备好了。

Many companies, faced with no real retained earnings with which to finance physical expansion after normal dividend payments, will improvise. How, they will ask themselves, can we stop or reduce dividends without risking stockholder wrath? I have good news for them: a ready-made set of blueprints is available.

近年来，电力行业几乎没有或没有分红能力。或者，更确切地说，如果投资者同意从他们那里购买股票，他们就有支付股息的能力。1975年，电力公司向普通股股东支付了33亿美元的股息，并要求投资者退还34亿美元。当然，他们也采用了一些向彼得索要钱来支付保罗的技巧，以免获得康埃迪（ED）的声誉。你可能还记得，康埃迪在1974年很不明智地简单地告诉股东，它没有钱支付股息。市场对坦诚的回报是灾难。

In recent years the electric-utility industry has had little or no dividend-paying capacity. Or, rather, it has had the power to pay dividends if investors agree to buy stock from them. In 1975 electric utilities paid common dividends of $3.3 billion and asked investors to return $3.4 billion. Of course, they mixed in a little solicit-Peter-to-pay-Paul technique so as not to acquire a Con Ed (ED) reputation. Con Ed, you will remember, was unwise enough in 1974 to simply tell its shareholders it didn’t have the money to pay the dividend. Candor was rewarded with calamity in the marketplace.

更精明的公用事业公司会维持——甚至增加——每季度的股息，然后要求股东（无论是老股东还是新股东）把钱寄回来。换句话说，公司发行新股。这种做法使大量的资本流向了税务机关和承销商。然而，每个人似乎都保持着良好的心情（尤其是承销商）。

The more sophisticated utility maintains — perhaps increases — the quarterly dividend and then ask shareholders (either old or new) to mail back the money. In other words, the company issues new stock. This procedure diverts massive amounts of capital to the tax collector and substantial sums to underwriters. Everyone, however, seems to remain in good spirits (particularly the underwriters).

AT&T的更多快乐 More joy at AT&T

受到这样的成功的鼓舞，一些公用事业公司想出了一个更快捷的办法。在这种情况下，公司宣布分红，股东缴纳税款，然后——咻——就发行了更多的股票。没有现金交易，尽管IRS，像往常一样，坚持把这笔交易当作现金交易来处理。

Encouraged by such success, some utilities have devised a further shortcut. In this case, the company declares the dividend, the shareholder pays the tax, and — presto — more shares are issued. No cash changes hands, although the IRS, spoilsport as always, persists in treating the transaction as if it had.

例如，AT&T（T）在1973年推出了一项股息再投资计划。这家公司，公平地说，必须被描述为非常重视股东的，而且考虑到金融的风俗习惯，它采用这个计划必须被视为完全可以理解的。但是这个计划的实质是出自爱丽丝梦游仙境。

AT&T (T), for example, instituted a dividend-reinvestment program in 1973. This company, in fairness, must be described as very stockholder-minded, and its adoption of this program, considering the folkways of finance, must be regarded as totally understandable. But the substance of the program is out of Alice in Wonderland.

1976年，美国电话电报公司（AT&T）向其约290万股东支付了23亿美元的现金股息。年底时，有64.8万股东（比前一年增加了4.7万）将4.32亿美元（比前一年增加了1.05亿美元）再投资于公司直接提供的额外股份。

In 1976, AT&T paid $2.3 billion in cash dividends to about 2.9 million owners of its common stock. At the end of the year, 648,000 holders (up from 601,000 the previous year) reinvested $432 million (up from $327 million) in additional shares supplied directly by the company.

就当作是一种乐趣，我们假设所有的AT&T股东最终都参加了这个计划。在这种情况下，股东们根本不会收到任何现金——就像当康埃迪发放股息时一样。然而，每一个290万个股东都会收到通知，他应该按照他在当年被称为“股息”的留存收益的份额缴纳所得税。假设“股息”总计23亿美元，与1976年相同，而且股东们平均要缴纳30%的税，那么他们最终会因为这个奇妙的计划，向IRS支付近7亿美元。想象一下，如果在这种情况下，董事会又将股息提高了一倍，股东们会有多高兴。

Just for fun, let’s assume that all AT&T shareholders ultimately sign up for this program. In that case, no cash at all would be mailed to shareholders — just as when Con Ed passed a dividend. However, each of the 2.9 million owners would be notified that he should pay income taxes on his share of the retained earnings that had that year been called a “dividend.” Assuming that “dividends” totaled $2.3 billion, as in 1976, and that shareholders paid an average tax of 30% on these, they would end up, courtesy of this marvelous plan, paying nearly $700 million to the IRS. Imagine the joy of shareholders, in such circumstances, if the directors were then to double the dividend.

政府会试图做到这一点 The government will try to do it

我们可以预期，随着企业面临真实资本积累的问题，更多地使用伪装的红利削减。但是稍微限制股东的收益并不能完全解决问题。7%的通货膨胀和12%的回报的结合，将减少企业用于资助真实增长的资本流量。

We can expect to see more use of disguised payout reductions as business struggles with the problem of real capital accumulation. But throttling back shareholders somewhat will not entirely solve the problem. A combination of 7% inflation and 12% returns will reduce the stream of corporate capital available to finance real growth.

随着通货膨胀的影响，传统的私人资本积累方式越来越失效，我们的政府将越来越多地试图影响资本流向工业，无论是像英国那样不成功，还是像日本那样成功。美国似乎缺乏日本式的政府、企业和劳工之间热情合作的文化和历史基础。如果我们幸运的话，我们将避免走英国的路，那里各个部门争夺分配饼干，而不是合力扩大饼干的大小。

And so, as conventional private capital-accumulation methods falter under inflation, our government will increasingly attempt to influence capital flows to industry, either unsuccessfully as in England or successfully as in Japan. The necessary cultural and historical underpinning for a Japanese-style enthusiastic partnership of government, business, and labor seems lacking here. If we are lucky, we will avoid following the English path, where all segments fight over division of the pie rather than pool their energies to enlarge it.

总的来说，然而，似乎很有可能在未来的几年里，我们会听到更多关于投资不足、滞胀和私营部门未能满足需求的失败的消息。

On balance, however, it seems likely that we will hear a great deal more as the years unfold about underinvestment, stagflation, and the failures of the private sector to fulfill needs.