巴菲特：待到皆大欢喜时，时不我与 You pay a very high price in the stock market for a cheery consensus

时间：1979年8月6日

来源：[Forbes](https://www.forbes.com/2008/11/08/buffett-forbes-article-markets-cx_pm-1107stocks.html)

原文标题：You pay a very high price in the stock market for a cheery consensus

正文

退休基金公司依然用着股票的历史表现进行投资决策。这种刻舟求剑式的选股方法在过去就被证明是不可取的，在这次也是如此。

Pension-fund managers continue to make investment decisions with their eyes firmly fixed on the rearview mirror. This generals-fighting-the-last-war approach has proven costly in the past and will likely prove equally costly this time around.

股票如今的价格水平意味着在未来能带来远超出债券的收益。但是退休基金经理们，常常是出于取悦他们的公司客户的目的（德国谚语：“谁给我面包，我将为他歌唱”），将债券投资的资金配比调整到了史上最高点。

Stocks now sell at levels that should produce long-term returns far superior to bonds. Yet pensions managers, usually encouraged by corporate sponsors they must necessarily please (“whose bread I eat, his song I sing”), are pouring funds in record proportions into bonds.

而另一方面，买入股市的订单的规模仿佛是用实验室滴管来衡量的。帕金森，也就是提出帕金森法则的作者，可能会说，股票的持有比例取决于近期投资的满意程度。无论是叫做李雷的路人，还是叫做韩梅梅的投资专家，在持股这件事上他们的行为趋势似乎是类似的。让我给你一些数据吧。

Meanwhile, orders for stocks are being placed with an eyedropper. Parkinson–of Parkinson’s law fame–might conclude that the enthusiasm of professionals for stocks varies proportionately with the recent pleasure derived from ownership. This always was the way John Q. Public was expected to behave. John Q. Expert seems similarly afflicted. Here’s the record.

1972年，当道琼斯指数上涨了$67.11，达到了$1,020，或者说从年初账面价值的$607上涨了11%的时候，退休基金经理们恨不得买股票的速度能够赶上上涨的速度。1972年权益的购入比例达到了行业总体的净值的105%（也就是说当中有人用了杠杆）。更加红火的上一年更是达到了前所未有的122%的。这两年的蜂拥而至将退休基金的权益资产比例从61%提高到了74% —— 而这个记录性的高比例的时间和道琼斯指数破纪录的新高点的时间巧妙地吻合。投资经理为股票支付的价格越高，他们越为此感到安心。

In 1972, when the Dow earned $67.11, or 11% on beginning book value of 607, it closed the year selling at 1,020, and pension managers couldn’t buy stocks fast enough. Purchases of equities in 1972 were 105% of net funds available (i.e., bonds were sold), a record except for the 122% of the even more buoyant prior year. This two-year stampede increased the equity portion of total pension assets from 61% to 74%–an all-time record that coincided nicely with a record-high price for the Dow. The more investment managers paid for stocks, the better they felt about them.

1973年到1974年，股票市场俯冲而下。1974年，虽然道琼斯最终涨了$99.04，达到了$616，或者说从年初账面价值的$690涨了14%。稳赚的投资机会？哎，可惜面对这样的低价，大家所做的并不是购入而是恐慌；仅有21%的基金可投资净值用于股票投资，这是25年来的最低点。私人未保险的退休基金的持股比例下降到了资产净值的54%，相比在道琼斯指数高上400点时那个看似合理的持股比例，下降了整整20%。

And then the market went into a tailspin in 1973-74. Although the Dow earned $99.04 in 1974, or 14% on beginning book value of 690, it finished the year selling at 616. A bargain? Alas, such bargain prices produced panic rather than purchases; only 21% of net investable funds went into equities that year, a 25-year record low. The proportion of equities held by private noninsured pension plans fell to 54% of net assets, a full 20-point drop from the level deemed appropriate when the Dow was 400 points higher.

在1976年的时候，退休基金持股的勇气是和股市价格一起上升的，在那时56%的资金用于股票投资。道琼斯那年的收市价格接近1,000，大约比账面价值高了25%。

By 1976, the courage of pension managers rose in tandem with the price level, and 56% of available funds was committed to stocks. The Dow that year averaged close to 1,000, a level then about 25% above book value.

1978年，股票的价格要远远实惠得多，全年大部分时间价格都是低于账面价值的。然而基金的持股比例达到了历史新低的9%。1979年的第一个季度依然保持着非常类似的低水平。

In 1978, stocks were valued far more reasonably, with the Dow selling below book value most of the time. Yet a new low of 9% of net funds was invested in equities during the year. The first quarter of 1979 continued at very close to the same level.

这么一来，退休基金的经理们，以一种前无古人的方式，倾向于买入收益率为9%到10%的债券，而且对以等于或低于账面价值买入美国权益的机会说不。但是这些退休基金经理们可能会私下承认，这些美国权益投资，在总体而言长期来看，能够带来13%的账面价值（最近几年的平均值）。而且，这些基金的企业客户管理层们也会压倒性的同意这一观点。

By these actions, pension managers, in record-setting manner, are voting for purchase of bonds–at interest rates of 9% to 10%–and against purchase of American equities at prices aggregating book value or less. But these same pension managers probably would concede that those American equities, in aggregate and over the longer term, would earn about 13% (the average in recent years) on book value. And, overwhelmingly, the managers of their corporate sponsors would agree.

实际上，很多公司的管理层对权益的态度呈现出双重人格。他们认为自己的公司的股票极端优异。但是，同时，他们也戳章赞成退休基金避开买入普通股的投资决策。同样是这些管理层，在戴着收购并购的帽子的时候，愿意为一家普通的美国公司账面价值支付150%到200%的价格，但是在戴着管理养老金的帽子时，会对相似的以账面价值买入公司股票的行为嗤之以鼻。管理层的管理能力难道真的如此优异？以至于对于能够插手经营的公司支付两倍的价格的行为认为依然合理，并拒绝一倍的价格买入的机会，假如只能拱手让谈判桌对面的同事继续独立经营。

Many corporate managers, in fact, exhibit a bit of schizophrenia regarding equities. They consider their own stocks to be screamingly attractive. But, concomitantly, they stamp approval on pension policies rejecting purchases of common stocks in general. And the boss, while wearing his acquisition hat, will eagerly bid 150% to 200% of book value for businesses typical of corporate America but, wearing his pension hat, will scorn investment in similar companies at book value. Can his own talents be so unique that he is justified both in paying 200 cents on the dollar for a business if he can get his hands on it, and in rejecting it as an unwise pension investment at 100 cents on the dollar if it must be left to be run by his companions at the Business Roundtable?

一个简单的条件反射可能是这样令人困惑的行为的主要原因。在过去的十年，股票为养老基金的公司客户和他们所雇佣的投资基金经理带来了痛苦。双方不太想回首往事。但是这样的痛苦并不是因为公司经营不善，而是股票的表现不及公司表现。这样的低迷表现不会永远持续下去，就像前段时间股票的超常表现吸引了养老基金以高价购入权益投资的情况一样无法持续。

A simple Pavlovian response may be the major cause of this puzzling behavior. During the last decade, stocks have produced pain–both for corporate sponsors and for the investment managers the sponsors hire. Neither group wishes to return to the scene of the accident. But the pain has not been produced because business has performed badly, but rather because stocks have underperformed business. Such underperformance cannot prevail indefinitely, any more than could the earlier overperformance of stocks versus business that lured pension money into equities at high prices.

在未来，比如说20年后，到期日是1999年的9.5%收益率的一系列美国公司债券有没有可能会提供比一系列以账面价值出售的蓝筹股更高的收益？这样的可能性看起来非常低。权益投资只有在重大的长期走低或者在20年的最后几年恰好遇到糟糕到难以置信的熊市时才显得不够好。如果市场的市盈率在未来20年逐步改善（我们可以预期13%的平均权益投资收益），那么目前的买入时机将会带来超出13%收益的。这个时候的收益率为9.5%的债券怎么会是更好的投资呢？

Can better results be obtained over, say, 20 years from a group of 9 1/2% bonds of leading American companies maturing in 1999 than from a group of Dow-type equities purchased, in aggregate, at around book value and likely to earn, in aggregate, around 13% on that book value? The probabilities seem exceptionally low. The choice of equities would prove inferior only if either a major sustained decline in return on equity occurs or a ludicrously low valuation of earnings prevails at the end of the 20-year period. Should price/earnings ratios expand over the 20-year period–and that 13% return on equity be averaged–purchases made now at book value will result in better than a 13% annual return. How can bonds at only 9 1/2% be a better buy?

让我们这么想，道琼斯指数的账面价值相当于债券的票面价值，或者说是债券的本金。然后我们可以把大概是13%的期望平均收益视为某种浮动利率债券（息票的一部分将会被加入到本金，就像是美国储蓄债券）。目前我们可以用非常大的折价买入“道琼斯债券”（以大约840的价格买入940的本金额度，目前道琼斯的账面价值。这个数字来自于旧式的道琼斯指数算法，没有经过重整。如果使用新式算法，那么收益将会略高，账面价值将会略低）。这么一个道琼斯债券可以以折价买入并获得13%的平均息票率。相比传统的需要以平价买入的9.5%收益率20年债券，在我看来像是一个好得多的长线投资，尽管息票会随着市场环境发生波动。

Think for a moment of book value of the Dow as equivalent to par, or the principal value of a bond. And think of the 13% or so expectable average rate of earnings on that book value as a sort of fluctuating coupon on the bond–a portion of which is retained to add to principal amount just like the interest return on U.S. Savings Bonds. Currently our “Dow Bond” can be purchased at a significant discount (at about 840 vs. 940 “principal amount,” or book value of the Dow. Figures are based on the old Dow, prior to the recent substitutions. The returns would be moderately higher and the book values somewhat lower if the new Dow had been used.). That Dow Bond purchased at a discount with an average coupon of 13%–even though the coupon will fluctuate with business conditions–seems to me to be a long-term investment far superior to a conventional 9 1/2% 20-year bond purchased at par.

当然了，没有人能保证未来企业的收益会达到平均13%的水平。养老基金投资经理避开股票的一个可能的原因是他们预期未来十年的权益投资收益将会大幅下降。但是，我并不认为大部分投资经理是因为这个原因。

Of course, there is no guarantee that future corporate earnings will average 13%. It may be that some pension managers shun stocks because they expect reported returns on equity to fall sharply in the next decade. However, I don’t believe such a view is widespread.

而事实是，投资经理认为股票不如债券是出于以下两个想法。有些人认为当前的收入普遍被高估，在考虑替换成本的折旧后的实际的收入是一个低得多的数字。因此，他们认为，13%的收益率实际并不存在。但是这一观点在一些投资领域并不成立，比如人寿保险，银行，火灾及意外保险，金融公司，以及服务类公司。

Instead, investment managers usually set forth two major objections to the thought that stocks should now be favored over bonds. Some say earnings currently are overstated, with real earnings after replacement-value depreciation far less than those reported. Thus, they say, real 13% earnings aren’t available. But that argument ignores the evidence in such investment areas as life insurance, banking, fire-casualty insurance, finance companies, service businesses, etc.

在这些行业中，使用替换成本会计方法和使用传统会计将会获得同样的财报数据。将这些行业的龙头公司的股票构建的投资组合将会有着接近账面价值的市场价值，并能提供13%或以上的收益率。更何况，我没见过哪个公司的管理层因为替换成本会计方法的事情，拒绝过13%收益率的投资。

In those industries, replacement-value accounting would produce results virtually identical with those produced by conventional accounting. And yet, one can put together a very attractive package of large companies in those fields with an expectable return of 13% or better on book value and with a price which, in aggregate, approximates book value. Furthermore, I see no evidence that corporate managers turn their backs on 13% returns in their acquisition decisions because of replacement-value accounting considerations.

第二个论据是，关于未来我们总是有太多的问号；难道不是等一切安定下来以后才是更好的时机吗？你应该听过“广积粮，高筑墙，缓称王”这样类似的话。在市场的拐点到来之前，我们需要接受两个不太令人愉悦的事实：未来永远不可知；在市场普遍乐观的时候，股价也变的高不可攀。不确定性其实是长线投资者的朋友。

A second argument is made that there are just too many question marks about the near future; wouldn’t it be better to wait until things clear up a bit? You know the prose: “Maintain buying reserves until current uncertainties are resolved,” etc. Before reaching for that crutch, face up to two unpleasant facts: The future is never clear; you pay a very high price in the stock market for a cheery consensus. Uncertainty actually is the friend of the buyer of long-term values.

如果要找最适合长线投资的人，那一定是退休基金经理。如果说公司的管理层们在进行溢价收购之前需要频繁的大额举债，大部分的退休基金基本不存在这样的资金限制。如果他们打算进行长线投资，就像他们现在买入20，30年期债券这样，他们有正当的理由这么做。他们可以，而且应该，以长线投资合伙的态度和期待买入股票。

If anyone can afford to have such a long-term perspective in making investment decisions, it should be pension-fund managers. While corporate managers frequently incur large obligations in order to acquire businesses at premium prices, most pension plans have very minor flow-of-funds problems. If they wish to invest for the long term–as they do in buying those 20- and 30-year bonds they now embrace–they certainly are in a position to do so. They can, and should, buy stocks with the attitude and expectations of an investor entering into a long-term partnership.

那些为了躲避养老基金管理责任的公司管理层们，正在为他们的那些图简单，不变通，或者赶时髦的投资决策付出代价。养老基金资产大概占据了整个行业1/3的净值，这一比例远大于其他的行业的平均水平。因此，此类资产的管理不善常常意味着公司最主要业务的经营不善。杰出的投资收益将会为企业客户带来巨大的收益，并且将会为未来的支付义务提供保障。

Corporate managers who duck responsibility for pension management by making easy, conventional or faddish decisions are making an expensive mistake. Pension assets probably total about one-third of overall industrial net worth and, of course, bulk far larger in the case of many specific industrial corporations. Thus, poor management of those assets frequently equates to poor management of the largest single segment of the business. Soundly achieved higher returns will produce significantly greater earnings for the corporate sponsors and will also enhance the security and prospective payments available to pensioners.

那些调低权益投资比例的基金经理，要么是对于美国公司的未来高度悲观，要么认为自己在找准时机用更低的价格抄底。在不远的未来可能确实会有金融市场普遍低迷的情况，从而有着更好入场机会；这样的机会在任何时候都会存在。但是你也同样会发现在这些时候，此时的未来看起来又是变化莫测又是不如人意。那些想等待“更好的时机”买入股票的人在这样的环境下很有可能只会继续等到下一个牛市到来以后才如梦初醒。

Managers currently opting for lower equity ratios either have a highly negative opinion of future American business results or expect to be nimble enough to dance back into stocks at even lower levels. There may well be some period in the near future when financial markets are demoralized and much better buys are available in equities; that possibility exists at all times. But you can be sure that at such a time the future will seem neither predictable nor pleasant. Those now awaiting a “better time” for equity investing are highly likely to maintain that posture until well into the next bull market.

福布斯评论：48岁的沃伦巴菲特平易近人。对于办公的地点，他选择家乡的奥马哈而不是华尔街的林立高楼。但是业内的人都认为这位本杰明格雷汉姆的学徒是这个时代最成功的基金经理。巴菲特在50年代和60年代为他本人以及他的客户带来了财富，但是在1969年，在找不到合适的投资机会的那一年，决定终止业务。在1974年的后半段，当道琼斯工业指数跌破600点，市场一片悲鸣时，他对福布斯的记者这么说道：“我像是一个性欲过剩的男人走进后宫。此时是投资的时刻。”几个月内，美国股市遇到了历史上最大的牛市，道琼斯在一年多一点的时间里上涨了将近450点。那么如今，巴菲特的想法又是如何？在这篇文章里，他的观点简单明了：现在是买入的时机。

Warren Buffett is a down-to-earth man of 48 who prefers to operate out of his native Omaha rather than in the canyons of Wall Street, but the pros regard him as possibly the most successful living money manager, a direct descendant of the legendary Ben Graham under whom he studied. Buffett made a fortune for himself and his clients in the Fifties and Sixties but threw in the towel in 1969 because he could no longer find bargains. Then in late 1974, when the Dow Jones industrials were below 600 and the air was thick with doom, he told Forbes: “I feel like an oversexed man in a harem. This is the time to start investing.” Within months, the greatest rally in history began, with the DJI running almost 450 points in a bit over a year. What does Buffett think now? In this article, he puts it bluntly: Now is the time to buy.