巴菲特：格雷汉姆多德流派的投资者们 The Superinvestors of Graham-and-Doddsville

时间：1984年5月17日

来源：[Columbia Business School](https://www8.gsb.columbia.edu/sites/valueinvesting/files/files/Buffett1984.pdf)

原文标题：The Superinvestors of Graham-and-Doddsville

格雷厄姆和多德“寻找相对于价格有显著安全边际的价值”这种证券分析方法是否过时了？今天写教科书的许多教授都说是。他们认为股市是有效的；也就是说，股价反映了关于公司前景和经济状况的所有已知信息。这些理论家认为，没有被低估的股票，因为有聪明的证券分析师利用所有可用的信息来确保始终合理的价格。那些年复一年看似击败市场的投资者只是幸运。一位今天的教科书作者写道：“如果价格充分反映了可用信息，这种投资技巧就被排除了。”

Is the Graham and Dodd “look for values with a significant margin of safety relative to prices” approach to security analysis out of date? Many of the professors who write textbooks today say yes. They argue that the stock market is efficient; that is, that stock prices reflect everything that is known about a company’s prospects and about the state of the economy. There are no undervalued stocks, these theorists argue, because there are smart security analysts who utilize all available information to ensure unfailingly appropriate prices. Investors who seem to beat the market year after year are just lucky. “If prices fully reflect available information, this sort of investment adeptness is ruled out,” writes one of today’s textbook authors.

好吧，也许可以。但是我想向你介绍一群投资者，他们年复一年地击败了标准普尔500指数。他们是靠纯粹的运气做到这一点的假设至少值得检验。这种检验的关键是这些赢家都是我所熟知的，并且在很久以前就被我认定为优秀的投资者，最近的一次认定是在十五年前。如果没有这个条件——也就是说，如果我今天早上才在成千上万的记录中为你挑选了几个名字——我会建议你现在就停止阅读。我还应该补充说，所有这些记录都经过了审计。我还应该进一步补充说，我认识许多与这些经理人合作过的人，这些参与者多年来收到的支票与所述记录相符。

Well, maybe. But I want to present to you a group of investors who have, year in and year out, beaten the Standard & Poor’s 500 stock index. The hypothesis that they do this by pure chance is at least worth examining. Crucial to this examination is the fact that these winners were all well known to me and pre-identified as superior investors, the most recent identification occurring over fifteen years ago. Absent this condition - that is, if I had just recently searched among thousands of records to select a few names for you this morning — I would advise you to stop reading right here. I should add that all of these records have been audited. And I should further add that I have known many of those who have invested with these managers, and the checks received by those participants over the years have matched the stated records.

在我们开始这个考察之前，我想让你想象一下一个全国性的硬币翻转比赛。假设我们明天早上让2.25亿美国人起床，我们要求他们都下注一美元。他们在日出时出门，他们都猜测硬币的正反面。如果他们猜对了，他们就从猜错的人那里赢得一美元。每天输的人就退出，第二天的赌注就会增加，因为所有之前赢得的钱都要拿出来。经过十次翻转，十天后，美国就会有大约22万人连续猜对了十次。他们每个人都会赢得一千多美元。

Before we begin this examination, I would like you to imagine a national coin-flipping contest. Let’s assume we get 225 million Americans up tomorrow morning and we ask them all to wager a dollar. They go out in the morning at sunrise, and they all call the flip of a coin. If they call correctly, they win a dollar from those who called wrong. Each day the losers drop out, and on the subsequent day the stakes build as all previous winnings are put on the line. After ten flips on ten mornings, there will be approximately 220,000 people in the United States who have correctly called ten flips in a row. They each will have won a little over $1,000.

现在这群人可能会开始有点得意忘形，人性就是这样。他们可能会试图保持谦虚，但在鸡尾酒会上，他们偶尔会向异性吸引力强的人承认他们的技巧是什么，以及他们对翻转领域带来了多么神奇的洞察力。

Now this group will probably start getting a little puffed up about this, human nature being what it is. They may try to be modest, but at cocktail parties they will occasionally admit to attractive members of the opposite sex what their technique is, and what marvelous insights they bring to the field of flipping.

假设赢家从输家那里得到了适当的奖励，在接下来的十天里，我们将有215个人成功地连续猜对了20次硬币的正反面，而且通过这个练习，他们每个人都把一美元变成了一百多万美元。2.25亿美元将会损失，2.25亿美元将会赢得。

Assuming that the winners are getting the appropriate rewards from the losers, in another ten days we will have 215 people who have successfully called their coin flips 20 times in a row and who, by this exercise, each have turned one dollar into a little over $1 million. $225 million would have been lost, $225 million would have been won.

到那时，这群人真的会失去理智。他们可能会写一些书，比如《我如何在二十天内用一美元换成一百万美元，每天只工作三十秒》。更糟糕的是，他们可能会飞遍全国，参加有关高效硬币翻转的研讨会，并对怀疑的教授说：“如果这是不可能的，为什么我们有215个人？”

By then, this group will really lose their heads. They will probably write books on “How I turned a Dollar into a Million in Twenty Days Working Thirty Seconds a Morning.” Worse yet, they’ll probably start jetting around the country attending seminars on efficient coin-flipping and tackling skeptical professors with, “If it can’t be done, why are there 215 of us?”

到那时，可能会有一位商学院教授无礼地提出这样一个事实：如果有2.25亿只猩猩进行了类似的实验，结果会大致相同——215只自负的猩猩连续翻了20次硬币。

By then some business school professor will probably be rude enough to bring up the fact that if 225 million orangutans had engaged in a similar exercise, the results would be much the same — 215 egotistical orangutans with 20 straight winning flips.

我认为，然而，我将要展示的例子有一些重要的不同之处。首先，如果（a）你把2.25亿只猩猩按照美国人口的分布大致分布；如果（b）20天后剩下215个赢家；如果（c）你发现40个来自奥马哈的某个动物园，你会很确定你发现了什么。所以你可能会出去问问动物园管理员他们吃了什么，他们有没有特别的锻炼，他们读了什么书，还有谁知道呢。也就是说，如果你发现了一些非常不寻常的成功集中，你可能想看看你能否找到一些不寻常的特征的集中，这些特征可能是因果因素。

I would argue, however, that there are some important differences in the examples I am going to present. For one thing, if (a) you had taken 225 million orangutans distributed roughly as the U.S. population is; if (b) 215 winners were left after 20 days; and if (c) you found that 40 came from a particular zoo in Omaha, you would be pretty sure you were on to something. So you would probably go out and ask the zookeeper about what he’s feeding them, whether they had special exercises, what books they read, and who knows what else. That is, if you found any really extraordinary concentrations of success, you might want to see if you could identify concentrations of unusual characteristics that might be causal factors.

科学探究自然地遵循这样的模式。如果你试图分析一种罕见的癌症的可能原因——比如说，在美国每年有1500例——而你发现其中400例发生在蒙大拿州的一个小矿镇，你就会对那里的水，或者那些患者的职业，或者其他变量感兴趣。你知道不是随机的巧合，400个来自一个小地区。你不一定知道因果因素，但你会知道在哪里寻找。

Scientific inquiry naturally follows such a pattern. If you were trying to analyze possible causes of a rare type of cancer — with, say, 1,500 cases a year in the United States — and you found that 400 of them occurred in some little mining town in Montana, you would get very interested in the water there, or the occupation of those afflicted, or other variables. You know it’s not random chance that 400 come from a small area. You would not necessarily know the causal factors, but you would know where to search.

我认为，除了地理之外，还有其他方式来定义一个起源。除了地理起源，还有我所说的智力起源。我想你会发现，在投资界成功的硬币翻转者中，有不成比例的多数来自一个非常小的智力村庄，可以称之为格雷厄姆-多德斯维尔。这个村庄的获胜者集中度是无法用偶然来解释的，可以追溯到这个特殊的智力村庄。

I submit to you that there are ways of defining an origin other than geography. In addition to geographical origins, there can be what I call an intellectual origin. I think you will find that a disproportionate number of successful coin-flippers in the investment world came from a very small intellectual village that could be called Graham-and-Doddsville. A concentration of winners that simply cannot be explained by chance can be traced to this particular intellectual village.

即使是这样的集中也可能无关紧要。也许有100个人只是在模仿某个非常有说服力的人物的抛硬币的叫法。当他叫正面时，100个追随者就自动地用同样的方式叫那枚硬币。如果这个领导者是最后剩下的215人中的一员，那么100个人来自同一个智力来源的事实就没有什么意义。你只是把一种情况当作了一百种情况。同样，假设你生活在一个强烈的父权社会，美国每个家庭恰好由十个成员组成。进一步假设，父权文化是如此强大，以至于在第一天出去的2.25亿人中，每个家庭的成员都认同父亲的叫法。现在，在20天的时间里，你会有215个赢家，你会发现他们来自只有21.5个家庭。一些天真的人可能会说，这表明存在着巨大的遗传因素作为成功抛硬币的解释。但是，这当然没有任何意义，因为它只是意味着你没有215个独立的赢家，而是有21.5个随机分布的家庭是赢家。

Conditions could exist that would make even that concentration unimportant. Perhaps 100 people were simply imitating the coin-flipping call of some terribly persuasive personality. When he called heads, 100 followers automatically called that coin the same way. If the leader was part of the 215 left at the end, the fact that 100 came from the same intellectual origin would mean nothing. You would simply be identifying one case as a hundred cases. Similarly, let’s assume that you lived in a strongly patriarchal society and every family in the United States conveniently consisted of ten members. Further assume that the patriarchal culture was so strong that, when the 225 million people went out the first day, every member of the family identified with the father’s call. Now, at the end of the 20-day period, you would have 215 winners, and you would find that they came from only 21.5 families. Some naive types might say that this indicates an enormous hereditary factor as an explanation of successful coin-flipping. But, of course, it would have no significance at all because it would simply mean that you didn’t have 215 individual winners, but rather 21.5 randomly distributed families who were winners.

在我想要考虑的这群成功的投资者中，有一个共同的智慧之父，本·格雷厄姆。但是这位智慧之父的子女们在决定如何“猜测”时却有着非常不同的方式。他们去了不同的地方，买卖了不同的股票和公司，但他们的综合表现却是随机机会无法解释的。当然也无法用他们都在按照一个领导者发出的信号来做出决定这样的事实来解释。智慧之父只是提出了做出猜测决策的智慧理论，但每个学生都自己决定了如何应用这个理论。

In this group of successful investors that I want to consider, there has been a common intellectual patriarch, Ben Graham. But the children who left the house of this intellectual patriarch have called their “flips” in very different ways. They have gone to different places and bought and sold different stocks and companies, yet they have had a combined record that simply cannot be explained by randon chance. It certainly cannot be explained by the fact that they are all calling flips identically because a leader is signaling the calls for them to make. The patriarch has merely set forth the intellectual theory for making coin-calling decisions, but each student has decided on his own manner of applying the theory.

来自格雷汉姆-格雷厄姆和多德斯维尔的投资者的共同智慧主题是：他们寻找企业价值和市场上该企业小部分的价格之间的差异。本质上，他们利用这些差异，而不关心有效市场理论家所关心的股票是在周一还是周四买入，或者是在一月还是七月等。顺便说一句，当商人购买企业时，这正是我们的格雷厄姆和多德投资者通过可市场化股票这种媒介所做的——我怀疑有多少人会把交易发生的星期几或月份纳入他们的购买决策中。如果购买整个企业是在周一还是周五并没有什么区别，我不明白为什么学者们要花费大量的时间和精力来研究购买这些相同企业的小部分是否有区别。我们的格雷厄姆和多德投资者，不用说，不讨论贝塔、资本资产定价模型或证券回报之间的协方差。这些对他们来说都不是感兴趣的话题。事实上，他们中的大多数都很难定义这些术语。投资者只关注两个变量：价格和价值。

The common intellectual theme of the investors from Graham-and-Doddsville is this: they search for discrepancies between the value of a business and the price of small pieces of that business in the market. Essentially, they exploit those discrepancies without the efficient market theorist’s concern as to whether the stocks are bought on Monday or Thursday, or whether it is January or July, etc. Incidentally, when businessmen buy businesses, which is just what our Graham & Dodd investors are doing through the medium of marketable stocks — I doubt that many are cranking into their purchase decision the day of the week or the month in which the transaction is going to occur. If it doesn’t make any difference whether all of a business is being bought on a Monday or a Friday, I am baffled why academicians invest extensive time and effort to see whether it makes a difference when buying small pieces of those same businesses. Our Graham & Dodd investors, needless to say, do not discuss beta, the capital asset pricing model, or covariance in returns among securities. These are not subjects of any interest to them. In fact, most of them would have difficulty defining those terms. The investors simply focus on two variables: price and value.

我总是觉得很奇怪，有这么多关于价格和成交量行为的研究，这些都是图表分析师的东西。你能想象仅仅因为上周和前一周的业务价格被大幅提高，就去买下一整个企业吗？当然，很多关于这些价格和成交量变量的研究之所以存在，是因为现在，在计算机时代，有关它们的数据几乎是无穷无尽的。这并不一定是因为这些研究有什么用处；只是因为数据就在那里，而学者们努力学习了处理它们所需的数学技能。一旦掌握了这些技能，就好像不使用它们是一种罪过，即使使用它们没有什么用处或者有负面的用处。正如一位朋友说的，对于一个拿着锤子的人来说，所有东西都像钉子。

I always find it extraordinary that so many studies are made of price and volume behavior, the stuff of chartists. Can you imagine buying an entire business simply because the price of the business had been marked up substantially last week and the week before? Of course, the reason a lot of studies are made of these price and volume variables is that now, in the age of computers, there are almost endless data available about them. It isn’t necessarily because such studies have any utility; it’s simply that the data are there and academicians have worked hard to learn the mathematical skills needed to manipulate them. Once these skills are acquired, it seems sinful not to use them, even if the usage has no utility or negative utility. As a friend said, to a man with a hammer, everything looks like a nail.

我认为我们通过一个共同的知识家园来识别的这个群体值得研究。顺便说一句，尽管有很多学术研究关注了价格、成交量、季节性、市值大小等变量对股票表现的影响，但没有人对这个不寻常的以价值为导向的赢家的方法感兴趣。

I think the group that we have identified by a common intellectual home is worthy of study. Incidentally, despite all the academic studies of the influence of such variables as price, volume, seasonality, capitalization size, etc., upon stock performance, no interest has been evidenced in studying the methods of this unusual concentration of value-oriented winners.

我从1954年到1956年在格雷厄姆-纽曼公司工作的四个人中开始研究这些结果。只有四个人——我没有从成千上万的人中挑选出这些名字。我在上了本·格雷厄姆的课后，主动提出无偿为格雷厄姆-纽曼公司工作，但他拒绝了我，认为我估值过高。他对这个价值的东西非常认真！在我不断地纠缠之下，他终于雇佣了我。公司有三个合伙人和我们四个“平民”级别的员工。我们四个人都在1955年到1957年之间离开了公司，当时公司正在清算，而且可以追踪到其中三个人的记录。

I begin this study of results by going back to a group of four of us who worked at Graham-Newman Corporation from 1954 through 1956. There were only four — I have not selected these names from among thousands. I offered to go to work at Graham-Newman for nothing after I took Ben Graham’s class, but he turned me down as overvalued. He took this value stuff very seriously! After much pestering he finally hired me. There were three partners and four of us at the “peasant” level. All four left between 1955 and 1957 when the firm was wound up, and it’s possible to trace the record of three.

第一个例子（见表1）是沃尔特·施洛斯的。沃尔特没有上过大学，但是在纽约金融学院晚上上了本·格雷厄姆的课。沃尔特于1955年离开了格雷厄姆-纽曼公司，在28年里取得了这里显示的成绩。这是我告诉他关于沃尔特的情况后，“亚当·史密斯”在《超级货币》（1972）中写的：

The first example (see Table 1) is that of Walter Schloss. Walter never went to college, but took a course from Ben Graham at night at the New York Institute of Finance. Walter left Graham-Newman in 1955 and achieved the record shown here over 28 years. Here is what ‘Adam Smith’ — after I told him about Walter — wrote about him in Supermoney (1972):

他没有任何关系或有用的信息。华尔街几乎没有人认识他，也没有人给他提供任何想法。他在手册里查看数字，索取年报，就这样而已。

He has no connections or access to useful information. Practically no one in Wall Street knows him and he is not fed any ideas. He looks up the numbers in the manuals and sends for the annual reports, and that’s about it.

在向我介绍（施洛斯）沃伦时，他在我看来也描述了他自己。‘他从不忘记他是在处理别人的钱，这加强了他对损失的正常强烈厌恶。’他有完全的诚信和对自己的现实认识。钱对他来说是真实的，股票也是真实的——由此产生了对‘安全边际’原则的吸引力。

In introducing me to (Schloss) Warren had also, to my mind, described himself. ‘He never forgets that he is handling other people’s money, and this reinforces his normal strong aversion to loss.’ He has total integrity and a realistic picture of himself. Money is real to him and stocks are real — and from this flows an attraction to the ‘margin of safety’ principle.

沃尔特拥有非常多样化的投资组合，目前拥有超过100种股票。他知道如何识别那些远低于其对私人所有者的价值的证券。而这就是他所做的一切。他不担心现在是一月份，他不担心现在是星期一，他不担心现在是选举年。他只是说，如果一家公司的价值是一美元，而我可以以40美分的价格买到它，那么我可能会有好运。他一次又一次地这样做。他拥有的股票比我多得多——并且对公司的本质性质也不太感兴趣；我似乎对沃尔特没有太大的影响力。这是他的一个优点；没有人能对他有太大的影响力。

Walter has diversified enormously, owning well over 100 stocks currently. He knows how to identify securities that sell at considerably less than their value to a private owner. And that’s all he does. He doesn’t worry about whether it it’s January, he doesn’t worry about whether it’s Monday, he doesn’t worry about whether it’s an election year. He simply says, if a business is worth a dollar and I can buy it for 40 cents, something good may happen to me. And he does it over and over and over again. He owns many more stocks than I do — and is far less interested in the underlying nature of the business; I don’t seem to have very much influence on Walter. That’s one of his strengths; no one has much influence on him.

表 1 · 沃尔特·施洛斯 Table 1 · Walter J. Schloss

年份 Year	标准普尔整体收益（包括股息） S&P Overall Gain. Including Dividend (%)	WJS Ltd Partners 合伙人每年整体收益 WJS Ltd Partners Overall Gain per year (%)	WJS Partnership合伙人每年整 WJS Partnership Overall Gain per year (%)
1956	7.5	5.1	6.8
1957	-10.5	-4.7	-4.7
1958	42.1	42.1	54.6
1959	12.7	17.5	23.3
1960	-1.6	7.0	9.3
1961	26.4	21.6	28.8
1962	-10.2	8.3	11.1
1963	23.3	15.1	20.1
1964	16.5	17.1	22.8
1965	13.1	26.8	35.7
1966	-10.4	0.5	0.7
1967	26.8	25.8	34.4
1968	10.6	26.6	35.5
1969	-7.5	-9.0	-9.0
1970	2.4	-8.2	-8.2
1971	14.9	25.5	28.3
1972	19.8	11.6	15.5
1973	-14.8	-8.0	-8.0
1974	-26.6	-6.2	-6.2
1975	36.9	42.7	52.2
1976	22.4	29.4	39.2
1977	-8.6	25.8	34.4
1978	7.0	36.6	48.4
1979	17.6	29.8	39.7
1980	32.1	23.3	31.1
1981	-6.7	18.4	24.5
1982	20.2	24.1	32.1
1983	22.8	38.4	51.2
1984 一季度 1st Qtr.	-2.3	0.8	1.1

标准普尔 28.5 年复合收益 Standard & Poor’s 28 1/4 year compounded gain	887.20%
WJS Limited Partners 28 1/4 年复合收益 WJS Limited Partners 28 1/4 year compounded gain	6678.80%
WJS Partnership 28 1/4 年复合收益 WJS Partnership 28 1/4 year compounded gain	23104.70%
标准普尔 28 1/4 年年化收益Standard & Poor’s 28 1/4 year annual compounded rate	8.10%
WJS Limited Partners 28 1/4 年年化收益 WJS Limited Partners 28 1/4 year annual compounded rate	16.10%
WJS Partnership 28 1/4 年年化收益 WJS Partnership 28 1/4 year annual compounded rate	21.30%

在合伙人运行的过程中产生过超过800次募资，并且在大多数时候至少拥有100个投资头寸，目前管理的资产约为4500万美元。During the history of the Partnership it has owned over 800 issues and, at most times, has had at least 100 positions, Present assets undermanagement approximate $45 million.

第二个例子是汤姆·纳普，他和我一起在格雷厄姆-纽曼公司工作过。汤姆在战前是普林斯顿大学的化学专业。战后，他成了一个海滩流浪者。有一天，他读到戴维·多德在哥伦比亚大学开设了一门投资学的夜间课程。汤姆以旁听的身份参加了这门课程，他对这门课程产生了极大的兴趣，于是他来到哥伦比亚商学院，获得了MBA学位。他又上了多德的课程，还上了本·格雷厄姆的课程。顺便说一句，35年后，我打电话给汤姆，想确认一些事实，我发现他又在海滩上了。唯一的区别是，现在他拥有了这片海滩！

The second case is Tom Knapp who also worked at Graham-Newman with me. Tom was a chemistry major at Princeton before the war; when he came back from the war, he was a beach bum. And then one day he read that Dave Dodd was giving a night course in investments at Columbia. Tom took it on a noncredit basis, and he got so interested in the subject from taking that course that he came up and enrolled at Columbia Business School, where he got the MBA degree. He took Dodd’s course again, and took Ben Graham’s course. Incidentally, 35 years later I called Tom to ascertain some of the facts involved here and I found him on the beach again. The only difference is that now he owns the beach!

1968年，汤姆·纳普和埃德·安德森，还有另外一两个同样信奉格雷厄姆的人，组成了Tweedy, Browne Partners，他们的投资成果见表2。Tweedy, Browne以非常广泛的多元化建立了这个记录。他们偶尔会买下企业的控制权，但是被动投资的记录和控制投资的记录是一样的。

In 1968, Tom Knapp and Ed Anderson, also a Graham disciple, along with one or two other fellows of similar persuasion, formed Tweedy, Browne Partners, and their investment results appear in Table 2. Tweedy, Browne built that record with very wide diversification. They occasionally bought control of businesses, but the record of the passive investments is equal to the record of the control investments.

表 2 · Tweedy, Browne 合伙人 Table 2 ·Tweedy,Browne Inc

截至 9 月 30 日的期间 Period Ended (September 30)	道琼斯 Dow Jones (%)	标准普尔 500 指数S&P 500 * (%)	TBK整体 TBK Overall (%)	TBK有限合伙人 TBK Limited Partners (%)
1968 (9个月数据 9 mos.)	6.0	8.8	27.6	22
1969	-9.5	-6.2	12.7	10.0
1970	-2.5	-6.1	-1.3	-1.9
1971	20.7	20.4	20.9	16.1
1972	11.0	15.5	14.6	11.8
1973	2.9	1.0	8.3	7.5
1974	-31.8	-38.1	1.5	1.5
1975	36.9	37.8	28.8	22
1976	29.6	30.1	40.2	32.8
1977	-9.9	-4.0	23.4	18.7
1978	8.3	11.9	41.0	32.1
1979	7.9	12.7	25.5	20.5
1980	13.0	21.1	21.4	17.3
1981	-3.3	-2.7	14.4	11.6
1982	12.5	10.1	10.2	8.2
1983	44.5	44.3	35.0	28.2
15 3/4 年总回报 Total Return 15 3/4 years	191.8%	238.5%	1661.2%	936.4%

标准普尔：15 3/4 年复合利率 Standard & Poor’s: 15 3/4 year annual compounded rate	7.0%
TBK 有限合伙人 153/4 年复合利率 TBK Limited Partners 153/4 year annual compounded rate	16.0%
TBK 整体 15 3/4 年复合利率 TBK Overall 15 3/4 year annual compounded rate	20.0%

*包括：为标准普尔 500 综合指数和杜琼斯工业平均指数支付的股息。Include: dividends paid for both Standard & Poor’s 500 Composite Index and Duw Jones Industrial Average.

表3描述了1957年组建巴菲特合伙公司的第三位成员。他做得最好的事情就是在1969年退出。从那时起，在某种意义上，伯克希尔·哈撒韦就是合伙公司的延续，至少在某些方面是这样。我不能给你一个单一的指标，我觉得这是对伯克希尔投资管理的一个公平的测试。但是我认为无论你怎么算，它都是令人满意的。

Table 3 describes the third member of the group who formed Buffett Partnership in 1957. The best thing he did was to quit in 1969. Since then, in a sense, Berkshire Hathaway has been a continuation of the partnership in some respects. There is no single index I can give you that I would feel would be a fair test of investment management at Berkshire. But I think that any way you figure it, it has been satisfactory.

表 3 · 巴菲特合伙有限公司 Table 3 · Buffett Partnership, Ltd.

年份 Year	道指的总体结果 Overall Results From Dow (%)	合伙人整体收益 Partnership Results (%)	有限合伙人收益Limited Partners Results (%)
1957	-8.4	10.4	9.3
1958	38.5	40.9	32.2
1959	20.0	25.9	20.9
1960	-6.2	22.8	18.6
1961	22.4	45.9	35.9
1962	-7.6	13.9	11.9
1963	20.6	38.7	30.5
1964	18.7	27.8	22.3
1965	14.2	47.2	36.9
1966	-15.6	20.4	16.8
1967	19.0	35.9	28.4
1968	7.7	58.8	45.6
1969	-11.6	6.8	6.6

*考虑累积或复合的结果 On a cumulative or compounded basis, the results are:

年份 Year	道指的总体结果 Overall Results From Dow (%)	合伙人整体收益 Partnership Results (%)	有限合伙人收益Limited Partners Results (%)
1957	-8.4	10.4	9.3
1957-58	26.9	55.6	44.5
1957-59	52.2	95.8	74.7
1957-60	42.8	140.5	107.2
1957-61	74.8	250.9	181.6
1957-62	61.5	299.7	215.1
1957-63	94.8	454.3	311.2
1957-64	131.2	608.4	402.9
1957-65	164	942.8	588.4
1957-66	122.8	1155.5	704.1
1957-67	165.2	1606.3	932.4
1957-68	185.6	2609.5	1403.2
1957-69	152.5	2793.8	1502.4
年化收益 Annual Compounded Rate	7.4	29.5	23.8

表4显示了由我在1951年本·格雷厄姆的课堂上认识的一个人管理的Sequoia Fund的记录，他叫比尔·鲁安。他从哈佛商学院毕业后，去了华尔街。然后他意识到他需要得到一份真正的商业教育，所以他来到哥伦比亚大学参加本的课程，我们在1951年初在那里相遇。比尔从1951年到1970年，用相对较小的资金，取得了远高于平均水平的业绩。当我结束巴菲特合伙人公司时，我问比尔是否愿意为我们所有的合伙人设立一个基金，于是他设立了Sequoia Fund。他在一个糟糕的时候设立了这个基金，就在我退出的时候。他直接进入了两层市场和所有给价值导向投资者带来相对表现困难的情况。我很高兴地说，我的合伙人们，在惊人的程度上，不仅留在了他身边，而且还增加了资金，结果如此令人高兴。

Table 4 shows the record of the Sequoia Fund, which is managed by a man whom I met in 1951 in Ben Graham’s class, Bill Ruane. After getting out of Harvard Business School, he went to Wall Street. Then he realized that he needed to get a real business education so he came up to take Ben’s course at Columbia, where we met in early 1951. Bill’s record from 1951 to 1970, working with relatively small sums, was far better than average. When I wound up Buffett Partnership I asked Bill if he would set up a fund to handle all of our partners, so he set up the Sequoia Fund. He set it up at a terrible time, just when I was quitting. He went right into the two-tier market and all the difficulties that made for comparative performance for value-oriented investors. I am happy to say that my partners, to an amazing degree, not only stayed with him but added money, with the happy result shown here.

表 4 · 红杉基金公司 Table 4 · Sequoia Fund, Inc.

年份 Year	红杉基金 Sequoia Fund (%)	标准普尔 500 指数 S&P 500 Index *
1970 (7月15日起 from July 15)	12.1	20.6
1971	13.5	14.3
1972	3.7	18.9
1973	-24	-14.8
1974	-15.7	-26.4
1975	60.5	37.2
1976	72.3	23.6
1977	19.9	-7.4
1978	23.9	6.4
1979	12.1	18.2
1980	12.6	32.3
1981	21.5	-5.0
1982	31.2	21.4
1983	27.3	22.4
1984 (第一季度 first quarter)	-160.0%	-2.4
累计 Entire Period	775.3%	270.00%
复合年回报率 Compound Annual Return	17.2%	10.00%
另加 1% 管理费 Plus 1% Management Fee	1.0%
总投资回报 Gross Investment Return	18.2%	10.00%

* 包括被视为再投资的股息（以及红杉基金的资本收益分配）Includes dividend (and capital gains distributions in the case of Sequoia Fund) treated as though reinvested.

** 由于计算或再投资股息的差异，这些数字与表 1 中的标准普尔数据略有不同 These figures differ slightly from the S&P figures in Table 1 because of a difference in calculation ot reinvested dividends.

并没有什么事后诸葛亮。比尔是我唯一推荐的投资人，我当时的说法是，如果他能年化超过标准普尔4%，就是很好的投资结果了。比尔的收益远超过这个标准，尽管后来的基金净值越来越大，而这也逐渐增大了管理的难度。管理规模会拖收益率的后腿。妥妥的如此。并不是说你没办法在管理大型基金时达到超额收益，只是这样的效果会缩小。试想一下，如果你一旦达到了2万亿美金的规模，而这个数值相当于全美国的经济总价值，你根本没办法超出平均值！

我在这里没有用到后见之明。比尔是我唯一向我的合伙人推荐的人，我当时说，如果他能比标准普尔指数每年高出四个百分点，那就是不错的表现。比尔不仅做到了这一点，而且还在管理着越来越多的资金。这使得事情变得更加困难。规模是业绩的拖累。这是毫无疑问的。这并不意味着你在规模变大后就不能比平均水平做得更好，但是优势会缩小。而且如果你最终管理了两万亿美元的资金，而这恰好是整个经济中所有股票的总市值，那么不要指望你能比平均水平做得更好！

我应该补充说，在我们迄今为止看过的记录中，在这整个时期里，这些投资组合几乎没有重复。这些都是根据价格和价值之间的差异来选择证券的人，但他们的选择方式非常不同。沃尔特的最大持仓是哈德逊浆纸和杰多高地煤炭和纽约陷阱岩公司等那些即使是对商业版面稍有了解的人也能立刻想起来的名字。Tweedy Browne的选择则沉没到了甚至低于这个水平的名气方面。另一方面，比尔则与大公司合作。这些投资组合之间的重叠非常非常低。这些记录并不反映一个人叫出翻转，然后有五十个人在他后面喊出同样的东西。

I should add that, in the records we’ve looked at so far, throughout this whole period there was practically no duplication in these portfolios. These are men who select securities based on discrepancies between price and value, but they make their selections very differently. Walter’s largest holdings have been such stalwarts as Hudson Pulp & Paper and Jeddo Highland Coal and New York Trap Rock Company and all those other names that come instantly to mind to even a casual reader of the business pages. Tweedy Browne’s selections have sunk even well below that level in terms of name recognition. On the other hand, Bill has worked with big companies. The overlap among these portfolios has been very, very low. These records do not reflect one guy calling the flip and fifty people yelling out the same thing after him.

表5是我一个朋友的记录，他是哈佛法学院的毕业生，他建立了一个大型的律师事务所。我在1960年左右遇到他，告诉他法律只是一种爱好，但他可以做得更好。他建立了一个与沃尔特完全相反的合伙关系。他的投资组合集中在很少的证券上，因此，他的业绩更加波动，但它是基于同样的价值折扣方法。他愿意接受更大的业绩高低，而且他恰好是一个整个心理都倾向于集中的人，结果如图所示。顺便说一下，这个记录属于查理·芒格，他是我在伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司运营方面的长期合伙人。当他经营自己的合伙关系时，然而，他的投资组合持有几乎完全不同于我和前面提到的其他人。

Table 5 is the record of a friend of mine who is a Harvard Law graduate, who set up a major law firm. I ran into him in about 1960 and told him that law was fine as a hobby but he could do better. He set up a partnership quite the opposite of Walter’s. His portfolio was concentrated in very few securities and therefore, his record was much more volatile but it was based on the same discount-from-value approach. He was willing to accept greater peaks and valleys of performance, and he happens to be a fellow whose whole psyche goes toward concentration, with the results shown. Incidentally, this record belongs to Charlie Munger, my partner for a long time in the operation of Berkshire Hathaway. When he ran his partnership, however, his portfolio holdings were almost completely different from mine and the other fellows mentioned earlier.

表 5 · 查理芒格 Table 5 · Charles Munger

每年收益 Yearly Results (l)	Mass. Inv. Trust (%)	Investors Stock (%)	Lehman (%)	Tri-Cont. (%)	道琼斯指数 Dow (%)	合伙人整体收益 Over-all Partnership (%)	有限合伙人收益 Limited Partners (%)
1962	-9.8	-13.4	-14.4	-12.2	-7.6	30.1	20.1
1963	20.0	16.5	23.8	20.3	20.6	71.7	47.8
1964	15.9	14.3	13.6	13.3	18.7	49.7	33.1
1965	10.2	9.8	19.0	10.7	14.2	8.4	6.0
1966	-7.7	-9.9	-2.6	-6.9	-15.7	12.4	8.3
1967	20.0	22.8	28.0	25.4	19.0	56.2	37.5
1968	10.3	8.1	6.7	6.8	7.7	40.4	27.0
1969	-4.8	-7.9	-1.9	0.1	-11.6	28.3	21.3
1970	0.6	-4.1	-7.2	-1.0	8.7	-0.1	-0.1
1971	9.0	16.8	26.6	22.4	9.8	25.4	20.6
1972	11.0	15.2	23.7	21.4	18.2	8.3	7.3
1973	-12.5	-17.6	-14.3	-21.3	-13.1	-31.9	-31.9
1974	-25.5	-25.6	-30.3	-27.6	-23.1	-31.5	-31.5
1975	32.9	33.3	30.8	35.4	44.4	73.2	73.2
复合收益Compound Results
1962	-9.8	-13.4	-14.4	-12.2	-7.6	30.1	20.1
1962-3	8.2	0.9	6.0	5.6	11.5	123.4	77.5
1962-4	25.5	15.3	20.4	19.6	32.4	234.4	136.3
1962-5	38.2	26.6	43.3	32.4	51.2	262.5	150.5
1962-6	27.6	14.1	39.5	23.2	27.5	307.5	171.3
1962-7	53.1	40.1	78.5	54.5	51.8	536.5	273.0
1962-8	68.9	51.4	90.5	65.0	63.5	793.6	373.7
1962-9	60.8	39.4	86.9	65.2	44.5	1046.5	474.6
1962-70	61.8	33.7	73.4	63.5	57.1	1045.4	474.0
1962-71	76.3	56.2	119.5	100.1	72.5	1336.3	592.2
1962-72	95.7	79.9	171.5	142.9	103.9	1455.5	642.7
1962-73	71.2	48.2	132.7	91.2	77.2	959.3	405.8
1962-74	27.5	10.3	62.2	38.4	36.3	625.6	246.5
1962-75	69.4	47.0	112.2	87.4	96.8	1156.7	500.1
平均年化收益 Average Annual Compounded Rate	3.8	2.8	5.5	4.6	5.0	19.8	13.7

表6是查理·芒格的一个朋友的记录——另一种非商学院类型的人——他是南加州大学的数学专业。他毕业后去了IBM工作，一段时间后成了IBM的销售员。我认识了查理，查理认识了他。这是里克·格林的记录。从1965年到1983年，里克以22,200%的复合增长率，击败了标准普尔指数的316%的复合增长率，这可能是因为他缺乏商学院教育，他认为这在统计上是显著的。

Table 6 is the record of a fellow who was a pal of Charlie Munger’s — another non-business school type — who was a math major at USC. He went to work for IBM after graduation and was an IBM salesman for a while. After I got to Charlie, Charlie got to him. This happens to be the record of Rick Guerin. Rick, from 1965 to 1983, against a compounded gain of 316 percent for the S&P, came off with 22,200 percent, which probably because he lacks a business school education, he regards as statistically significant.

表 6 · 太平洋合伙人 Table 6 · Pacific Partners, Ltd.

年份 Year	标准普尔 500 指数 S&P500 Index (%)	有限合伙企业收益 Limited Partnership Results (%)	整体合伙人收益 Overall Partnership Results (%)
1965	12.4	21.2	32.0
1966	-10.1	24.5	36.7
1967	23.9	120.1	180.1
1968	11.0	114.6	171.9
1969	-8.4	64.7	97.1
1970	3.9	-7.2	-7.2
1971	14.6	10.9	16.4
1972	18.9	12.8	17.1
1973	-14.8	-42.1	-42.1
1974	-26.4	-34.4	-34.4
1975	37.2	23.4	31.2
1976	23.6	127.8	127.8
1977	-7.4	20.3	27.1
1978	6.4	28.4	37.9
1979	18.2	36.1	48.2
1980	32.3	18.1	24.1
1981	-5.0	6.0	8.0
1982	21.4	24.0	32.0
1983	22.4	18.6	24.8

标准普尔19年累计收益 Standard & Poor’s 19 year compounded gain	316.4%
有限合伙人19年累计收益 Ltd. Partnership 19 year compounded gain	5530.2%
整体合伙人19年累计收益 Overall Partnership 19 year compounded gain	22200.0%
标准普尔500 19年年化收益 Standard & Poor’s 19 year annual compounded rate	7.8%
有限合伙人19年年化收益 Ltd. Partnership 19 year annual compounded rate	23.6%
整体合伙人 19 年年化收益 Overall Partnership 19 year annual compounded rate	32.9%

我觉得很奇怪，有些人一听到用4毛钱买一块钱的东西，就立刻明白了这个道理，有些人却怎么也不明白。这就像打了预防针一样。如果一开始就没有抓住他们，我发现你可以跟他们说几年，给他们看记录，也没有用。他们似乎无法理解这个概念，尽管它很简单。像Rick Guerin这样的人，虽然没有受过正规的商业教育，但是他立刻就明白了价值投资的方法，并且在五分钟之内就开始运用了。我从来没有见过有人在十年的时间里逐渐转变为这种方法的信徒。这似乎与智商或学术训练无关。要么是一见如故，要么是毫无感觉。

One sidelight here: it is extraordinary to me that the idea of buying dollar bills for 40 cents takes immediately to people or it doesn’t take at all. It’s like an inoculation. If it doesn’t grab a person right away, I find that you can talk to him for years and show him records, and it doesn’t make any difference. They just don’t seem able to grasp the concept, simple as it is. A fellow like Rick Guerin, who had no formal education in business, understands immediately the value approach to investing and he’s applying it five minutes later. I’ve never seen anyone who became a gradual convert over a ten-year period to this approach. It doesn’t seem to be a matter of IQ or academic training. It’s instant recognition, or it is nothing.

表7是斯坦·佩尔米特的记录。斯坦是密歇根大学的文科专业，曾是广告公司Bozell & Jacobs的合伙人。我们碰巧在奥马哈的同一栋楼里。1965年，他发现我比他有更好的生意，于是他离开了广告行业。同样，斯坦只用了五分钟就接受了价值投资的方法。

Table 7 is the record of Stan Perlmeter. Stan was a liberal arts major at the University of Michigan who was a partner in the advertising agency of Bozell & Jacobs. We happened to be in the same building in Omaha. In 1965 he figured out I had a better business than he did, so he left advertising. Again, it took five minutes for Stan to embrace the value approach.

表 7 · 佩尔米特基金 Table 7 · Perimeter Investments

年份 Year	佩尔米特基金总体 PIL Overall (%)	有限合伙人收益 Limited Partner (%)
8/1-12/31/65	40.6	32.5
1966	6.4	5.1
1967	73.5	58.8
1968	65.0	52.0
1969	-13.8	-13.8
1970	-6.0	-6.0
1971	55.7	49.3
1972	23.6	18.9
1973	-28.1	-28.1
1974	-12.0	-12.0
1975	38.5	38.5
1/1-10/31/76	38.2	34.5
11/1/76-10/31/77	30.3	25.5
11/1/77-10/31/78	31.8	26.6
11/1/78-10/31/79	34.7	28.9
11/1/79-10/31/80	41.8	34.7
11/1/80-10/31/81	4.0	3.3
11/1/81-10/31/82	29.8	25.4
11/1/82-10/31/83	22.2	18.4

8/1/65 至 10/31/83 的合作人总体收益 Total Partnership Percentage Gain 8/1/65 through 10/31/83	4277.20%
8/1/65 至 10/31/83有限合伙人整体收益 Limited Partners Percentage Gain 8/1/65 through 10/31/83	2309.50%
合伙人整体年化收益 Annual Compound Rate of Gain Overall Partnership	23.00%
有限合伙人年化收益 Annual Compound Rate of Gain Limited Partners	19.00%
1965年7月31日道琼斯工业平均指数（近似值） Dow Jones Industrial Averages 7/31/65 (Approximate)	882
1983年10月31日道琼斯工业平均指数（近似值） Dow Jones Industrial Averages 10/31/83 (Approximate)	1225
包括股息的道琼斯工业平均指数近似年化收益率 Approximate Compound Rate of Gain of DJI including dividends	7%

Perlmeter和沃尔特·施洛斯（Walter Schloss）的持仓不一样。他也和比尔·鲁安（Bill Ruane）的持仓不一样。这些都是他们独立创造的记录。但是每次Perlmeter买一支股票，都是因为他花的钱比他得到的价值少。这是他唯一考虑的事情。他不看季度盈利预测，他不看明年的盈利，他不在乎今天是星期几，他不在乎任何地方的投资研究报告，他对价格动量、成交量或者任何其他东西都不感兴趣。他只问一个问题：这个企业值多少钱？

Perlmeter does not own what Walter Schloss owns. He does not own what Bill Ruane owns. These are records made independently. But every time Perlmeter buys a stock it’s because he’s getting more for his money than he’s paying. That’s the only thing he’s thinking about. He’s not looking at quarterly earnings projections, he’s not looking at next year’s earnings, he’s not thinking about what day of the week it is, he doesn’t care what investment research from any place says, he’s not interested in price momentum, volume, or anything. He’s simply asking: What is the business worth?

表8和表9是我参与的两个养老基金的记录。它们不是从我参与的数十个养老基金中挑选出来的；它们是我唯一有影响力的两个。在这两种情况下，我都建议他们选择以价值为导向的管理者。非常非常少的养老基金是从价值的角度来管理的。表8是华盛顿邮报公司的养老基金。它以前是一个大银行，我建议他们最好选择一些有价值取向的管理者。

Table 8 and Table 9 are the records of two pension funds I’ve been involved in. They are not selected from dozens of pension funds with which I have had involvement; they are the only two I have influenced. In both cases I have steered them toward value-oriented managers. Very, very few pension funds are managed from a value standpoint. Table 8 is the Washington Post Company’s Pension Fund. It was with a large bank some years ago, and I suggested that they would do well to select managers who had a value orientation.

表 8 · 华盛顿邮报公司，总信托，1983 年 12 月 31 日 Table 8 · The Washington Post Company, Master Trust, December 31, 1983

所有投资 All Investments	当前季度收益 Current Quarter % Ret.	当前季度排名 Current Quarter Rank	年终收益 Year Ended % Ret.	年终排名 Year Ended Rank	2 年结束收益 2 Years Ended % Ret.	2 年结束排名 2 Years Ended Rank	3 年结束收益 3 Years Ended % Ret.	3 年结束排名 3 Years Ended Rank	5 年结束收益 5 Years Ended % Ret.	5 年结束排名 5 Years Ended Rank
	4.1	2	22.5	10	20.6	40	18.0	10	20.2	3
	3.2	4	34.1	1	33.0	1	28.2	1	22.6	1
	5.4	1	22.2	11	28.4	3	24.5	1	-	-
总信托 Master Trust	3.9	1	28.1	1	28.2	1	24.3	1	21.8	1
普通股 Common Stock
	5.2	1	32.1	9	26.1	27	21.2	11	26.5	7
	3.6	5	52.9	1	46.2	1	37.8	1	29.3	3
	6.2	1	29.3	14	30.8	10	29.3	3	-	-
总信托 Master Trust	4.7	1	41.2	1	37.0	1	30.4	1	27.6	1
债券 Bonds
	2.7	8	17.0	1	26.6	1	19.0	1	12.2	2
	1.6	46	7.6	48	18.3	53	12.7	84	7.4	86
	3.2	4	10.4	9	24.0	3	18.9	1	-	-
总信托 Master Trust	2.2	11	9.7	14	21.1	14	15.2	24	9.3	30
债券和现金等价物 Bonds & Cash Equivalents
	2.5	15	12.0	5	16.1	64	15.5	21	12.9	9
	2.1	28	9.2	29	17.1	47	14.7	41	10.8	44
	3.1	6	10.2	17	22.0	2	21.6	1	-	-
总信托 Master Trust	2.4	14	10.2	17	17.8	20	16.2	2	12.5	9

*年化Annualized

排名表示基金相对于 A.C. Becker 基金的表现 Rank indicates the fund’s performance against the A.C. Becker universe.

排名以百分位数表示：1 = 最佳 100 = 最差 Rank is stated as a percentile: 1 = best performance. 100 = worst.

你可以看到，自从他们做出改变以来，他们一直处于最高百分位。邮报告诉经理们，至少要把这些基金的25%放在债券上，这可能不是这些经理们的选择。所以，我把债券的表现也包括进来，只是为了说明，这个团队对债券没有什么特别的专长。他们也不会说他们有。即使有这样一个拖累，即他们的基金中有25%的部分在一个不是他们擅长的领域，他们仍然处于基金管理的最高百分位。华盛顿邮报的经验并没有涵盖一个很长的时期，但它确实代表了三位经理做出的许多投资决策，而这些经理并不是事后才被确定的。

As you can see, overall they have been in the top percentile ever since they made the change. The Post told the managers to keep at least 25 percent of these funds in bonds, which would not have been necessarily the choice of these managers. So, I’ve included the bond performance simply to illustrate that this group has no particular expertise about bonds. They wouldn’t have said they did. Even with this drag of 25 percent of their fund in an area that was not their game, they were in the top percentile of fund management. The Washington Post experience does not cover a terribly long period but it does represent many investment decisions by three managers who were not identified retroactively.

表9是FMC公司基金的记录。我自己没有管理过它的一分钱，但是在1974年，我影响了他们选择价值导向的管理者的决定。在那之前，他们选择管理者的方式和大多数大公司差不多。他们现在在贝克调查中排名第一，这是一个针对他们这个规模的养老金基金在这段时间后转向价值方法的调查。去年他们有八个股权管理者，任期超过一年。其中七个的累计业绩都比标准普尔指数好。所有八个去年的业绩都比标准普尔指数好。现在，中等业绩和FMC基金在这段时间内的实际业绩之间的净差额是2.43亿美元。FMC将这归功于他们在选择管理者时给予他们的思维方式。这些管理者不一定是我会选择的管理者，但是他们有一个共同点，就是根据价值选择证券。

Table 9 is the record of the FMC Corporation fund. I don’t manage a dime of it myself but I did, in 1974, influence their decision to select value-oriented managers. Prior to that time they had selected managers much the same way as most larger companies. They now rank number one in the Becker survey of pension funds for their size over the period of time subsequent to this “conversion” to the value approach. Last year they had eight equity managers of any duration beyond a year. Seven of them had a cumulative record better than the S&P. All eight had a better record last year than the S&P. The net difference now between a median performance and the actual performance of the FMC fund over this period is $243 million. FMC attributes this to the mindset given to them about the selection of managers. Those managers are not the managers I would necessarily select but they have the common denominators of selecting securities based on value.

表 9 · FMC 公司养老基金 年回报率（百分比）Table 9 · FMC Corporation Pension Fund. Annual Rate of Return (Percent)

投资期限（年） Period ending	1 Year	2 Years	3 Years	4 Years	5 Years	6 Years	7 Years	8 Years	9 Years
FMC
1983	23.0								*17.1
1982	22.8	13.6	16.0	16.6	15.5	12.3	13.9	16.3
1981	5.4	13.0	15.3	13.8	10.5	12.6	15.4
1980	21.0	19.7	16.8	11.7	14.0	17.3
1979	18.4	14.7	8.7	12.3	16.5
1978	11.2	4.2	10.4	16.1
1977	-2.3	9.8	17.8
1976	23.8	29.3
1975	35.0								*权益投资收益为18.5 18.5 from equities only

投资期限（年） Period ending	1 Year	2 Years	3 Years	4 Years	5 Years	6 Years	7 Years	8 Years	9 Years
Becker 计划中位数 Becker large plan median
1983	15.6								12.6
1982	21.4	11.2	13.9	13.9	12.5	9.7	10.9	12.3
1981	1.2	10.8	11.9	10.3	7.7	8.9	10.9
1980	20.9	NA	NA	NA	10.8	NA
1979	13.7	NA	NA	NA	11.1
1978	6.5	NA	NA	NA
1977	-3.3	NA	NA
1976	17.0	NA
1975	24.1

投资期限（年） Period ending	1 Year	2 Years	3 Years	4 Years	5 Years	6 Years	7 Years	8 Years	9 Years
标准普尔 500 指数 S&P 500
1983	22.8								15.6
1982	21.5	7.3	15.1	16.0	14.0	10.2	12.0	14.9
1981	-5.0	12.0	14.2	12.2	8.1	10.5	14.0
1980	32.5	25.3	18.7	11.7	14.0	17.5
1979	18.6	12.4	5.5	9.8	14.8
1978	6.6	-0.8	6.8	13.7
1977	-7.7	6.9	16.1
1976	23.7	30.3
1975	37.2

这些是格雷厄姆和多德斯维尔的“掷硬币者”的九条记录。我没有从成千上万的人中回顾性地挑选他们。这不像我在向你背诵一群彩票中奖者的名字——他们是我在他们中奖之前从未听说过的人。我是根据他们的投资决策框架在多年前选择了这些人。我知道他们学到了什么，另外，我对他们的智力、品格和气质也有一些个人了解。要明白，这个群体承担的风险远低于平均水平；注意他们在整体市场疲软的年份的表现。虽然他们在风格上有很大的不同，但这些投资者在心理上总是在买入企业，而不是买入股票。他们中的一些人有时会买下整个企业，但更多时候，他们只是买下企业的一小部分。无论是买下全部还是一小部分企业，他们的态度都是一样的。他们中有些人持有数十只股票的投资组合；另一些人则集中于少数几只。但他们都利用了企业的市场价值和内在价值之间的差异。

So these are nine records of “coin-flippers” from Graham-and-Doddsville. I haven’t selected them with hindsight from among thousands. It’s not like I am reciting to you the names of a bunch of lottery winners — people I had never heard of before they won the lottery. I selected these men years ago based upon their framework for investment decision-making. I knew what they had been taught and additionally I had some personal knowledge of their intellect, character, and temperament. It’s very important to understand that this group has assumed far less risk than average; note their record in years when the general market was weak. While they differ greatly in style, these investors are, mentally, always buying the business, not buying the stock. A few of them sometimes buy whole businesses far more often they simply buy small pieces of businesses. Their attitude, whether buying all or a tiny piece of a business, is the same. Some of them hold portfolios with dozens of stocks; others concentrate on a handful. But all exploit the difference between the market price of a business and its intrinsic value.

我相信市场上存在着很多低效率。这些格雷厄姆和多德维尔的投资者成功地利用了价格和价值之间的差距。当一只股票的价格可以受到华尔街“羊群”的影响，而价格又是由最情绪化的人、最贪婪的人或最沮丧的人在边际上决定的时候，很难说市场总是理性定价的。事实上，市场价格经常是荒谬的。

I’m convinced that there is much inefficiency in the market. These Graham-and-Doddsville investors have successfully exploited gaps between price and value. When the price of a stock can be influenced by a “herd” on Wall Street with prices set at the margin by the most emotional person, or the greediest person, or the most depressed person, it is hard to argue that the market always prices rationally. In fact, market prices are frequently nonsensical.

我想说一件关于风险和回报的重要事情。有时风险和回报之间存在正相关。如果有人对我说，“我这里有一把六发手枪，我已经把一颗子弹装进去了。你为什么不转一转然后扣一下扳机呢？如果你活下来，我会给你100万美元。”我会拒绝——也许会说100万美元不够多。然后他可能会提议我扣两下扳机，给我500万美元——这就是风险和回报之间的正相关！

I would like to say one important thing about risk and reward. Sometimes risk and reward are correlated in a positive fashion. If someone were to say to me, “I have here a six-shooter and I have slipped one cartridge into it. Why don’t you just spin it and pull it once? If you survive, I will give you $1 million.” I would decline — perhaps stating that $1 million is not enough. Then he might offer me $5 million to pull the trigger twice — now that would be a positive correlation between risk and reward!

价值投资恰恰相反。如果你用60美分买一美元，风险比你用40美分买一美元要大，但后者的回报期望更高。价值投资组合的回报潜力越大，风险就越小。

The exact opposite is true with value investing. If you buy a dollar bill for 60 cents, it’s riskier than if you buy a dollar bill for 40 cents, but the expectation of reward is greater in the latter case. The greater the potential for reward in the value portfolio, the less risk there is.

一个简单的例子：1973年，华盛顿邮报公司在市场上的售价是8000万美元。那天，你可以把它的资产卖给任何一个买家，不低于4亿美元，甚至可能更多。该公司拥有邮报、新闻周刊，以及几个主要市场的电视台。现在，这些财产的价值是20亿美元，所以那个愿意出4亿美元的人也不算疯了。

One quick example: The Washington Post Company in 1973 was selling for $80 million in the market. At the time, that day, you could have sold the assets to any one of ten buyers for not less than $400 million, probably appreciably more. The company owned the Post, Newsweek, plus several television stations in major markets. Those same properties are worth $2 billion now, so the person who would have paid $400 million would not have been crazy.

现在，如果这只股票的价格进一步下跌，使得它的估值从8000万美元降到4000万美元，它的贝塔系数就会更高。而对于那些认为贝塔系数衡量风险的人来说，更低的价格会让它看起来更有风险。这真是令人难以置信。我从来不明白，为什么以4000万美元买入价值4亿美元的资产比以8000万美元买入更有风险。而且，事实上，如果你买入一组这样的证券，并且对商业估值有一定的了解，以4000万美元买入价值4亿美元的资产是几乎没有风险的，特别是如果你是通过买入十个价值4000万美元的、每个包含800万美元现金的资产堆。由于你没有掌握这4亿美元，你要确保你和诚实、能力相当的人合作，但这并不是一件难事。

Now, if the stock had declined even further to a price that made the valuation $40 million instead of $80 million, its beta would have been greater. And to people that think beta measures risk, the cheaper price would have made it look riskier. This is truly Alice in Wonderland. I have never been able to figure out why it’s riskier to buy $400 million worth of properties for $40 million than $80 million. And, as a matter of fact, if you buy a group of such securities and you know anything at all about business valuation, there is essentially no risk in buying $400 million for $80 million, particularly if you do it by buying ten $40 million piles of $8 million each. Since you don’t have your hands on the $400 million, you want to be sure you are in with honest and reasonably competent people, but that’s not a difficult job.

你还必须有足够的知识，让你能够对底层企业的价值做出一个大致的估计。但你不要把它做得太精确。这就是本·格雷厄姆所说的保证安全边际。你不要试图用8000万美元买下价值8300万美元的企业。你要给自己留下一个巨大的空间。当你建造一座桥梁时，你要确保它能承受3万磅的重量，但你只开1万磅的卡车过桥。这个原则在投资中也同样适用。

You also have to have the knowledge to enable you to make a very general estimate about the value of the underlying businesses. But you do not cut it close. That is what Ben Graham meant by having a margin of safety. You don’t try and buy businesses worth $83 million for $80 million. You leave yourself an enormous margin. When you build a bridge, you insist it can carry 30,000 pounds, but you only drive 10,000 pound trucks across it. And that same principle works in investing.

最后，你们中一些更有商业头脑的人可能会想，我为什么要写这篇文章。让更多的人转向价值投资，必然会缩小价格和价值之间的差距。我只能告诉你们，这个秘密已经公开了50年，自从本·格雷厄姆和戴维·多德写了《证券分析》以来，我在过去的35年里从事价值投资，却没有看到这种趋势。似乎有一种扭曲的人类特性，喜欢把简单的事情搞复杂。如果说有什么变化的话，学术界在过去的30年里，反而从教授价值投资中退缩了。这种情况可能会继续下去。船只会绕着地球航行，但是“地球是平的”协会会兴旺发达。市场上价格和价值之间的差距会继续存在，那些阅读过格雷厄姆和多德的人会继续获利。

In conclusion, some of the more commercially minded among you may wonder why I am writing this article. Adding many converts to the value approach will perforce narrow the spreads between price and value. I can only tell you that the secret has been out for 50 years, ever since Ben Graham and Dave Dodd wrote Security Analysis, yet I have seen no trend toward value investing in the 35 years that I’ve practiced it. There seems to be some perverse human characteristic that likes to make easy things difficult. The academic world, if anything, has actually backed away from the teaching of value investing over the last 30 years. It’s likely to continue that way. Ships will sail around the world but the Flat Earth Society will flourish. There will continue to be wide discrepancies between price and value in the marketplace, and those who read their Graham & Dodd will continue to prosper.