查理·芒格：伯克希尔--过去、现在和未来（来自2014年股东信）

时间：2014年02月27日

来源：Berkshire Hathaway Letters to Shareholders, 2014

原文标题：Vice Chairman’s Thoughts — Past and Future

亲爱的伯克希尔哈撒韦股东们：

To the shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

我密切关注了伯克希尔哈撒韦在沃伦·巴菲特的领导下取得的50年非凡成功历程。现在，独立地补充一下他所发表的任何庆祝性评论似乎是合适的。我将尝试做五件事情：

I closely watched the 50-year history of Berkshire’s uncommon success under Warren Buffett. And it now seems appropriate that I independently supplement whatever celebratory comment comes from him. I will try to do five things.

1.描述导致一家小型、注定无法挽救的商品纺织企业，如何演变成如今强大的伯克希尔的管理体系和政策。

1.Describe the management system and policies that caused a small and unfixably-doomed commodity textile business to morph into the mighty Berkshire that now exists,

2.解释管理体系和政策的形成过程。

2.Explain how the management system and policies came into being,

3.在一定程度上解释伯克希尔为何表现出色。

3.Explain, to some extent, why Berkshire did so well,

4.预测如果巴菲特很快离开，是否会继续取得异常出色的业绩。

4.Predict whether abnormally good results would continue if Buffett were soon to depart, and

5.考虑伯克希尔在过去50年取得的非凡成就是否具有可能在其他地方有用的含义。

5.Consider whether Berkshire’s great results over the last 50 years have implications that may prove useful elsewhere.

伯克希尔在巴菲特（以下统称为“伯克希尔体系”）的管理体制和政策早已确定，如下所述：

The management system and policies of Berkshire under Buffett (herein together called “the Berkshire system”) were fixed early and are described below:

1.伯克希尔将成为一个分散的企业集团，只对无法做出有用预测的活动持避免态度。

1.Berkshire would be a diffuse conglomerate, averse only to activities about which it could not make useful predictions.

2.其顶级公司几乎所有业务都将通过独立的子公司进行，这些子公司的首席执行官将拥有极高的自主权。

2.Its top company would do almost all business through separately incorporated subsidiaries whose CEOs would operate with very extreme autonomy.

3.集团总部几乎没有其他人员，只有一个小小的办公套间，其中包括主席、首席财务官和几名主要协助首席财务官进行审计、内部控制等的助手。

3.There would be almost nothing at conglomerate headquarters except a tiny office suite containing a Chairman, a CFO, and a few assistants who mostly helped the CFO with auditing, internal control, etc.

4.伯克希尔的子公司将始终包括财产险公司。预计这些保险公司将作为一个群体，产生可靠的承保盈利，同时产生大量的“浮动资金”（来自未支付的保险赔款），用于投资。

4.Berkshire subsidiaries would always prominently include casualty insurers. Those insurers as a group would be expected to produce, in due course, dependable underwriting gains while also producing substantial “float” (from unpaid insurance liabilities) for investment.

5.由于子公司将拥有自己的系统，通常是不同的，所以不会有重要的系统范围的人事系统、股票期权系统、其他激励系统、退休制度等。

5.There would be no significant system-wide personnel system, stock option system, other incentive system, retirement system, or the like, because the subsidiaries would have their own systems, often different.

6.伯克希尔的主席将仅保留一些活动：

6.Berkshire’s Chairman would reserve only a few activities for himself.

i.他将管理几乎所有的证券投资，这些投资通常位于伯克希尔的财产险公司。

i.He would manage almost all security investments, with these normally residing in Berkshire’s casualty insurers.

ii.他将挑选所有重要子公司的首席执行官，并确定他们的薪酬，并从每位首席执行官那里获取在需要时能立即提供的继任者的私人推荐。

ii.He would choose all CEOs of important subsidiaries, and he would fix their compensation and obtain from each a private recommendation for a successor in case one was suddenly needed.

iii.他将在不需要的子公司增加竞争优势后，部署大部分现金，理想的部署是将这些现金用于收购新的子公司。

iii.He would deploy most cash not needed in subsidiaries after they had increased their competitive advantage, with the ideal deployment being the use of that cash to acquire new subsidiaries.

iv.他将迅速提供给任何子公司首席执行官希望的几乎所有联系，并且几乎不需要额外的联系。

iv.He would make himself promptly available for almost any contact wanted by any subsidiary’s CEO, and he would require almost no additional contact.

v.他将撰写一封长篇、逻辑且有用的信件，设计成如果他只是一名被动股东时希望它的样子，并将在年度股东大会上花费数小时回答问题。

v.He would write a long, logical, and useful letter for inclusion in his annual report, designed as he would wish it to be if he were only a passive shareholder, and he would be available for hours of answering questions at annual shareholders’ meetings.

vi.他将努力成为一种对顾客、股东和其他利益相关者都能长期运作良好的文化的楷模，不论在他离开前后都是如此。

vi.He would try to be an exemplar in a culture that would work well for customers, shareholders, and other incumbents for a long time, both before and after his departure.

vii.他的首要任务将是为安静的阅读和思考保留大量时间，特别是那些可能推动他的不断学习的时间，无论他年龄多大；

vii.His first priority would be reservation of much time for quiet reading and thinking, particularly that which might advance his determined learning, no matter how old he became; and

viii.并且他还将花费大量时间热情地欣赏其他人所取得的成就。

viii.He would also spend much time in enthusiastically admiring what others were accomplishing.

7.新子公司通常会用现金购买，而不是新发行的股票。

7.New subsidiaries would usually be bought with cash, not newly issued stock.

8.只要每一美元的留存收益能为股东创造一美元以上的市值，伯克希尔不会支付股息。

8.Berkshire would not pay dividends so long as more than one dollar of market value for shareholders was being created by each dollar of retained earnings.

9.在购买新子公司时，伯克希尔会寻求以合理的价格收购一家优质企业，而主席能够相当了解该企业。伯克希尔还希望有一位优秀的首席执行官，预计将长期任职，并且能够在不需要总部帮助的情况下有效管理。

9.In buying a new subsidiary, Berkshire would seek to pay a fair price for a good business that the Chairman could pretty well understand. Berkshire would also want a good CEO in place, one expected to remain for a long time and to manage well without need for help from headquarters.

10.在选择子公司首席执行官时，伯克希尔会努力确保他们的可信度、技能、活力，以及对所在行业和环境的热爱。

10.In choosing CEOs of subsidiaries, Berkshire would try to secure trustworthiness, skill, energy, and love for the business and circumstances the CEO was in.

11.作为首选行为的重要事项，伯克希尔几乎永远不会出售子公司。

11.As an important matter of preferred conduct, Berkshire would almost never sell a subsidiary.

12.伯克希尔几乎不会将子公司的首席执行官调至其他无关的子公司。

12.Berkshire would almost never transfer a subsidiary’s CEO to another unrelated subsidiary.

13.伯克希尔永远不会因年龄而强迫子公司首席执行官退休。

13.Berkshire would never force the CEO of a subsidiary to retire on account of mere age.

14.伯克希尔会保持较低的债务，以保持在各种情况下（i）几乎完美的信用和（ii）轻松获得现金和信贷，以应对出现不寻常机会的时刻。

14.Berkshire would have little debt outstanding as it tried to maintain (i) virtually perfect creditworthiness under all conditions and (ii) easy availability of cash and credit for deployment in times presenting unusual opportunities.

15.伯克希尔始终对欲出售大型企业的潜在卖家友好。这样的业务提议将得到迅速的关注。如果没有导致交易，除了主席和伯克希尔的一两位高管外，没有人会知道这一提议。他们也不会向外界透露。

15.Berkshire would always be user-friendly to a prospective seller of a large business. An offer of such a business would get prompt attention. No one but the Chairman and one or two others at Berkshire would ever know about the offer if it did not lead to a transaction. And they would never tell outsiders about it.

伯克希尔（Berkshire）的制度要素和其规模之大都非常不同寻常。我不知道其他任何一家大公司有半数以上的这种制度要素。 Both the elements of the Berkshire system and their collected size are quite unusual. No other large corporation I know of has half of such elements in place.

伯克希尔是如何获得与众不同的企业性格的呢？

How did Berkshire happen to get a corporate personality so different from the norm?

嗯，巴菲特（Buffett）即使在34岁的时候，也控制了伯克希尔约45%的股份，并且得到了所有其他大股东的完全信任。他可以安装任何他想要的制度。而他确实这么做了，创造了伯克希尔的制度。

Well, Buffett, even when only 34 years old, controlled about 45% of Berkshire’s shares and was completely trusted by all the other big shareholders. He could install whatever system he wanted. And he did so, creating the Berkshire system.

几乎每个要素都是因为巴菲特认为，在他的领导下，它将有助于最大化伯克希尔的业绩而选择的。他并不试图为其他公司创建一种适合所有情况的制度。实际上，伯克希尔的子公司并不需要在自己的业务中使用伯克希尔的制度。有些公司采用不同的制度也一样蓬勃发展。

Almost every element was chosen because Buffett believed that, under him, it would help maximize Berkshire’s achievement. He was not trying to create a one-type-fits-all system for other corporations. Indeed, Berkshire’s subsidiaries were not required to use the Berkshire system in their own operations. And some flourished while using different systems.

那么，巴菲特在设计伯克希尔的制度时的目标是什么呢？

What was Buffett aiming at as he designed the Berkshire system?

嗯，多年来，我诊断出了一些重要的主题：

Well, over the years I diagnosed several important themes:

1.他特别希望系统中最重要的人，从他自己开始，能够不断提高理性、技能和投入度。

1.He particularly wanted continuous maximization of the rationality, skills, and devotion of the most important people in the system, starting with himself.

2.他希望在任何地方都能取得双赢的结果，比如通过给予忠诚来获得忠诚。

2.He wanted win/win results everywhere—in gaining loyalty by giving it, for instance.

3.他希望能够做出最大化长期效益的决策，并从那些通常能够长时间留在岗位上承担决策后果的决策者那里寻求这种决策。

3.He wanted decisions that maximized long-term results, seeking these from decision makers who usually stayed long enough in place to bear the consequences of decisions.

4.他希望能够将总部大型官僚体制几乎不可避免带来的负面影响降至最低。

4.He wanted to minimize the bad effects that would almost inevitably come from a large bureaucracy at headquarters.

5.他希望能够像本·格雷厄姆教授一样，为传播所获智慧作出个人贡献。

5.He wanted to personally contribute, like Professor Ben Graham, to the spread of wisdom attained.

当巴菲特开发伯克希尔体系时，是否预见到了随之而来的所有好处呢？并不是。巴菲特通过实践演进偶然获得了一些好处。但是，当他看到有用的后果时，他加强了它们的原因。

When Buffett developed the Berkshire system, did he foresee all the benefits that followed? No. Buffett stumbled into some benefits through practice evolution. But, when he saw useful consequences, he strengthened their causes.

为什么在巴菲特的领导下，伯克希尔表现得如此出色？我只能想到四个主要因素：

Why did Berkshire under Buffett do so well? Only four large factors occur to me:

1.巴菲特的建设性特质，

1.The constructive peculiarities of Buffett,

2.伯克希尔体系的建设性特质，

2.The constructive peculiarities of the Berkshire system,

3.好运气，以及

3.Good luck, and

4.一些股东和其他崇拜者的异常热情和感染力，包括一些媒体。

4.The weirdly intense, contagious devotion of some shareholders and other admirers, including some in the press.

我相信所有四个因素都存在并且起到了帮助作用。但是最重要的负担是由建设性特质、奇怪的热情以及它们的相互作用承担的。

I believe all four factors were present and helpful. But the heavy freight was carried by the constructive peculiarities, the weird devotion, and their interactions.

特别是，巴菲特决定将他的活动限制在几种领域，并最大程度地关注它们，然后坚持这样做了50年，这是一场lollapalooza。巴菲特之所以成功，原因与罗杰·费德勒成为一名优秀的网球运动员相同。

In particular, Buffett’s decision to limit his activities to a few kinds and to maximize his attention to them, and to keep doing so for 50 years, was a lollapalooza. Buffett succeeded for the same reason Roger Federer became good at tennis.

实际上，巴菲特采用了著名篮球教练约翰·伍登的胜利方法，后者在学会将几乎所有比赛时间分配给他的七名最佳球员之后，经常获得胜利。这样，对手总是面对他最佳的球员，而不是次佳的球员。而且，由于额外的比赛时间，最佳球员的进步超过了正常水平。

Buffett was, in effect, using the winning method of the famous basketball coach, John Wooden, who won most regularly after he had learned to assign virtually all playing time to his seven best players. That way, opponents always faced his best players, instead of his second best. And, with the extra playing time, the best players improved more than was normal.

而巴菲特在这方面表现得比伍登更出色，因为在他的情况下，技能的发挥集中在一个人身上，而不是七个人，而且他的技能在50年间不断提高，而不像篮球运动员的技能会衰退。

And Buffett much out-Woodened Wooden, because in his case the exercise of skill was concentrated in one person, not seven, and his skill improved and improved as he got older and older during 50 years, instead of deteriorating like the skill of a basketball player does.

而且，通过将如此多的权力和权威集中在经常长期任职的重要子公司首席执行官手中，巴菲特也在那里创造了强烈的伍登式效应。这些效应增强了首席执行官的技能以及子公司的业绩。

Moreover, by concentrating so much power and authority in the often-long-serving CEOs of important subsidiaries, Buffett was also creating strong Wooden-type effects there. And such effects enhanced the skills of the CEOs and the achievements of the subsidiaries.

然后，随着伯克希尔体系赋予许多子公司和其首席执行官所渴望的自治权，并且伯克希尔变得成功并广为人知，这些结果吸引了更多更好的子公司加入伯克希尔，以及更优秀的首席执行官。

Then, as the Berkshire system bestowed much-desired autonomy on many subsidiaries and their CEOs, and Berkshire became successful and well known, these outcomes attracted both more and better subsidiaries into Berkshire, and better CEOs as well.

而更好的子公司和首席执行官则需要总部的注意力较少，从而形成了通常所称的“良性循环”。

And the better subsidiaries and CEOs then required less attention from headquarters, creating what is often called a “virtuous circle.”

伯克希尔始终将财险公司列为重要子公司，这一策略运作得如何？

How well did it work out for Berkshire to always include casualty insurers as important subsidiaries?

非常出色。伯克希尔的雄心壮志非常过分，尽管如此，它还是得到了想要的结果。

Marvelously well. Berkshire’s ambitions were unreasonably extreme and, even so, it got what it wanted.

财险公司通常将投资的公共股票价值大致等于其股东权益，正如伯克希尔的保险子公司所做的那样。而标普500指数在过去50年中前税前每年产生了约10%的收益，为其提供了显著的顺风支持。

Casualty insurers often invest in common stocks with a value amounting roughly to their shareholders’ equity, as did Berkshire’s insurance subsidiaries. And the S&P 500 Index produced about 10% per annum, pre-tax, during the last 50 years, creating a significant tailwind.

而且，在巴菲特时代的早期几十年里，伯克希尔的保险子公司内的普通股大大超过了指数，正如巴菲特所预期的那样。后来，由于伯克希尔的股票持有规模庞大以及税收考虑因素导致超越指数的回报部分消失得无影无踪（也许并非永久性的），其他更好的优势出现了。阿吉特·贾因（Ajit Jain）凭空创造了一个巨大的再保险业务，产生了巨额的“浮动资金”和大幅度的承保收益。而所有的GEICO也被纳入了伯克希尔，随后GEICO的市场份额翻了四倍。伯克希尔的其他保险业务也有了巨大的改进，主要是因为声誉优势、承保纪律、找到并保持在良好的领域内，以及招聘和留住杰出的人员。

And, in the early decades of the Buffett era, common stocks within Berkshire’s insurance subsidiaries greatly outperformed the index, exactly as Buffett expected. And, later, when both the large size of Berkshire’s stockholdings and income tax considerations caused the index-beating part of returns to fade to insignificance (perhaps not forever), other and better advantage came. Ajit Jain created out of nothing an immense reinsurance business that produced both a huge “float” and a large underwriting gain. And all of GEICO came into Berkshire, followed by a quadrupling of GEICO’s market share. And the rest of Berkshire’s insurance operations hugely improved, largely by dint of reputational advantage, underwriting discipline, finding and staying within good niches, and recruiting and holding outstanding people.

后来，随着伯克希尔几乎独特且非常可靠的企业性格和庞大规模的知名度，其保险子公司获得并抓住了许多有吸引力的机会，其他人无法获得，以购买私人发行的证券。这些大多数证券都有固定到期日，并产生了杰出的结果。

Then, later, as Berkshire’s nearly unique and quite dependable corporate personality and large size became well known, its insurance subsidiaries got and seized many attractive opportunities, not available to others, to buy privately issued securities. Most of these securities had fixed maturities and produced outstanding results.

伯克希尔在保险方面的出色成果并不是自然而然的结果。通常情况下，意外险业务是产生平庸结果的生产者，即使管理得很好。而这种结果没有多大用处。伯克希尔的更好结果如此之大，以至于我相信，如果巴菲特回到一个小基础但保留他的智慧并重返青春，他现在将无法重现这一成就。

Berkshire’s marvelous outcome in insurance was not a natural result. Ordinarily, a casualty insurance business is a producer of mediocre results, even when very well managed. And such results are of little use. Berkshire’s better outcome was so astoundingly large that I believe that Buffett would now fail to recreate it if he returned to a small base while retaining his smarts and regaining his youth.

伯克希尔因为是一个分散的多元化企业集团而受到困扰吗？不，它的机会因为扩大了经营范围而变得有用。而其他地方常见的不良影响都被巴菲特的技巧所防止。

Did Berkshire suffer from being a diffuse conglomerate? No, its opportunities were usefully enlarged by a widened area for operation. And bad effects, common elsewhere, were prevented by Buffett’s skills.

伯克希尔为什么更喜欢用现金购买公司，而不是用自己的股票？嗯，很难用伯克希尔的股票换取与所放弃的同等价值的东西。

Why did Berkshire prefer to buy companies with cash, instead of its own stock? Well, it was hard to get anything in exchange for Berkshire stock that was as valuable as what was given up.

伯克希尔收购保险业之外的公司为什么对伯克希尔的股东而言效果如此好，而在此类收购中的正常结果对收购方的股东来说通常是不利的？

Why did Berkshire’s acquisition of companies outside the insurance business work out so well for Berkshire shareholders when the normal result in such acquisitions is bad for shareholders of the acquirer?

嗯，伯克希尔的设计使其在更好的机会之外还拥有方法论上的优势。它从未有过相当于“收购部门”的部门，不受购买压力影响。它也从不依赖于“助手”的建议，这些助手肯定会偏向于交易。巴菲特将自我欺骗拒之门外，虽然他比大多数企业高管更清楚业务中的得失，受到他作为被动投资者长期经验的帮助。最后，即使在伯克希尔得到比大多数其他人更好的机会时，巴菲特常常表现出近乎不人性的耐心，很少购买。例如，在他掌控伯克希尔的前十年，巴菲特看到一家企业（纺织业）濒临破产，而又引入了两家新企业，净增加了一家。

Well, Berkshire, by design, had methodological advantages to supplement its better opportunities. It never had the equivalent of a “department of acquisitions” under pressure to buy. And it never relied on advice from “helpers” sure to be prejudiced in favor of transactions. And Buffett held self-delusion at bay as he underclaimed expertise while he knew better than most corporate executives what worked and what didn’t in business, aided by his long experience as a passive investor. And, finally, even when Berkshire was getting much better opportunities than most others, Buffett often displayed almost inhuman patience and seldom bought. For instance, during his first ten years in control of Berkshire, Buffett saw one business (textiles) move close to death and two new businesses come in, for a net gain of one.

伯克希尔在巴菲特的领导下犯了哪些重大错误呢？嗯，虽然做出错误决策是常见的，但几乎所有巨大的错误都是因为未能进行投资，包括没有购买沃尔玛股票，而那几乎肯定会取得巨大成功。遗漏的错误非常重要。如果当时足够聪明去认识到这些几乎是确定的事情并抓住了其中的几次机会，伯克希尔的净资产现在至少会高出500亿美元。

What were the big mistakes made by Berkshire under Buffett? Well, while mistakes of commission were common, almost all huge errors were in not making a purchase, including not purchasing Walmart stock when that was sure to work out enormously well. The errors of omission were of much importance. Berkshire’s net worth would now be at least $50 billion higher if it had seized several opportunities it was not quite smart enough to recognize as virtually sure things.

我列表上倒数第二项任务是：预测如果巴菲特即将离世，伯克希尔是否会继续取得异常出色的业绩。

The next to last task on my list was: Predict whether abnormally good results would continue at Berkshire if Buffett were soon to depart.

答案是肯定的。伯克希尔在其子公司中拥有很多业务势头，这些势头基于持久的竞争优势。

The answer is yes. Berkshire has in place in its subsidiaries much business momentum grounded in much durable competitive advantage.

此外，它的铁路和公用事业子公司现在提供了大量有吸引力的投资机会，用于投资新的固定资产。而且许多子公司现在正致力于进行明智的“附加”收购。

Moreover, its railroad and utility subsidiaries now provide much desirable opportunity to invest large sums in new fixed assets. And many subsidiaries are now engaged in making wise “bolt-on” acquisitions.

前提是伯克希尔的大部分体系保持不变，目前所具备的合并势头和机会如此之大，伯克希尔几乎肯定会在很长时间内保持高于正常水平的公司，以至于即使：

Provided that most of the Berkshire system remains in place, the combined momentum and opportunity now present is so great that Berkshire would almost surely remain a better-than-normal company for a very long time even if

（1）巴菲特明天离开，（2）他的继任者只具有中等能力，以及（3）伯克希尔再也不购买大型企业。

(1) Buffett left tomorrow, (2) his successors were persons of only moderate ability, and (3) Berkshire never again purchased a large business.

但在这个巴菲特即将离去的假设下，他的继任者不会仅仅具有“中等能力”。例如，阿吉特·贾因（Ajit Jain）和格雷格·阿贝尔（Greg Abel）是经验丰富的表现出色的人，他们很可能不应该仅被描述为“世界级”。我会选择描述他们为“世界领先”。在某些重要方面，他们中的每一个都是比巴菲特更好的业务高管。

But, under this Buffett-soon-leaves assumption, his successors would not be “of only moderate ability.” For instance, Ajit Jain and Greg Abel are proven performers who would probably be under-described as “world-class.” “World-leading” would be the description I would choose. In some important ways, each is a better business executive than Buffett.

而且，我相信无论发生什么情况，贾因和阿贝尔都不会（1）离开伯克希尔，也不会（2）渴望对伯克希尔体系进行太多改变。

And I believe neither Jain nor Abel would (1) leave Berkshire, no matter what someone else offered or (2) desire much change in the Berkshire system.

我也不认为，在巴菲特离开后，购买新企业的愿望将结束。由于伯克希尔现在规模如此之大，激进主义的时代已经来临，我认为一些有吸引力的收购机会将出现，并且伯克希尔的600亿美元现金将会有建设性地减少。

Nor do I think that desirable purchases of new businesses would end with Buffett’s departure. With Berkshire now so large and the age of activism upon us, I think some desirable acquisition opportunities will come and that Berkshire’s $60 billion in cash will constructively decrease.

我的最后任务是考虑伯克希尔在过去50年取得的卓越成绩是否具有可能在其他地方产生有用影响的含义。

My final task was to consider whether Berkshire’s great results over the last 50 years have implications that may prove useful elsewhere.

答案显然是肯定的。在巴菲特早期的伯克希尔时代，公司面临着巨大的任务：将一小笔资金变成一家庞大而有用的公司。它通过避免官僚主义，长期依赖一个充满思考的领导者，不断改进并引入更多像他自己这样的人来解决这个问题。

The answer is plainly yes. In its early Buffett years, Berkshire had a big task ahead: turning a tiny stash into a large and useful company. And it solved that problem by avoiding bureaucracy and relying much on one thoughtful leader for a long, long time as he kept improving and brought in more people like himself.

与典型的大型公司体系相比，后者在总部设有大量官僚机构，CEO的长期继任通常在大约59岁时上任，之后很少有时间进行深思熟虑，很快就会因强制退休年龄而被迫离职。

Compare this to a typical big-corporation system with much bureaucracy at headquarters and a long succession of CEOs who come in at about age 59, pause little thereafter for quiet thought, and are soon forced out by a fixed retirement age.

我认为伯克希尔体系的版本应该更经常在其他地方尝试，并且官僚主义的最坏特征应该更经常地被视为它们所相似的癌症。官僚主义的修复的一个很好的例子是由乔治·马歇尔（George Marshall）创造的，他通过获得国会的权利来选择将军时可以忽略资历的问题，从而帮助赢得了第二次世界大战。

I believe that versions of the Berkshire system should be tried more often elsewhere and that the worst attributes of bureaucracy should much more often be treated like the cancers they so much resemble. A good example of bureaucracy fixing was created by George Marshall when he helped win World War II by getting from Congress the right to ignore seniority in choosing generals.

真诚地，

Sincerely,

查尔斯·T·芒格 Charles T. Munger